IThe Brian P. Murphy OSB Archive. (Series 9)
The Evolution of British Policy and the Emergence of a Sinn Fein Publicity Department
in the years After the Easter Rising, 1916-1918.
Mss Notes, Part 23
Irish Bulletin—The Municipal Elections and Crime Statistics
Valuable as these actions of the Irish Bulletin were [in highlighting actions of the British Government in curbing Irish Democracy: see December Irish Political Review], they were but the prelude to a major publicity campaign that was occasioned by the elections to Municipal Councils of 16th January 1920. In its issue of 19th January 1920, several quotations were given from the London press which acknowledged the success of Sinn Fein: the Daily Mail reported that: “as was generally anticipated, Sinn Fein has been victorious”; the Daily News stated that “the Irish Municipal Elections have put the Republicans in power in nine-tenths of the townships outside Ulster”; and the Daily Chronicle declared that “Sinn Fein now replaces the Nationalist party and has an immense majority throughout the country” (IB, 19 Jan.’20).
Some time later the Irish Bulletin publicised the analysis of the results by the Special Correspondent of the Manchester Guardian who deduced that 73.3% of the people were against the Union with England and only 26.7% in favour. The correspondent concluded that, if there was a plebiscite on the question of union with Great Britain or an independent Irish Republic, it “would produce about a two-thirds majority for the Republic” (Irish Bulletin, 4 March 1920. NB get precise figures.?? cf. Martin in Daily News for figures.
The Bulletin then gave its own verdict on the result:
“these sweeping successes by Sinn Fein are not only the expression of the will of the Irish people in favour of the Republican movement but, as is more significant, is its expression in spite of a combination of trickery and aggression by the English Government” (IB, 19 Jan.’20).
As an example of trickery, the Bulletin focussed on the introduction of Proportional Representation into Ireland, and to Ireland alone [within the UK, ed.], by an act of the British Parliament in July 1919. This Act, it was claimed, was a response to the Sinn Fein General Election success and was designed to minimise the chances of Sinn Fein in the Municipal Elections.
In order to substantiate this allegation, the Bulletin quoted from the Manchester Guardian of 12th January 1920 to the effect that—
“Dublin Castle suddenly discovered P.R. as a means whereby a Sinn Fein majority would be prevented from becoming a Sinn Fein monopoly—and Dublin Castle decided to scrap the entire system of local governing bodies in favour of a complete scheme of P.R.” (Ibid).
It was also pointed out that the Local Government Board of Ireland, members of which were nominees of Dublin Castle, had created new electoral areas favourable to those loyal to the English Government on 19th September 1919. Moreover, it was maintained that the official registration agents in the north of Ireland, mostly members of the Unionist Party, had refused to register significant numbers of Sinn Fein and Nationalist property holders as voters.
The Irish Bulletin also listed acts of intimidation and aggression by the Government that were further designed to impair Sinn Fein’s electoral chances. Using the past records of the journal, some twenty such incidents were listed between 20th September 1919 and 15th January 1920. After a narration of attacks on the press, the suppression of nationalist organisations, and the deportation of Sinn Fein leaders, the list concluded with a report on 15th January 1920 of an attack on Sinn Fein voters in Cork by an organisation of ex-soldiers. It was also reported that, immediately prior to the election, many Sinn Fein election Manifestoes and Posters were either suppressed or damaged. (Ibid. ?? Give list as appendix.)
This chronicle of incidents was put into context by Arthur Griffith in an interview with the Irish Independent on 19th January 1920 and then carried in the Irish Bulletin. Griffith declared that—
“Sinn Fein had to face this election with its political organisation suppressed by the English Government, its election literature interdicted, its transit arrangements deliberately obstructed by the Motor Permit Order, its secretary, Alderman Kelly, seized and imprisoned without charge, and its Press stifled, and, in spite of all, it had swept the country…” (IB 20 Jan.’20 ?? manifesto in appendix ?? something on Indep.)
Griffith claimed that three-quarters of the Metropolitan Corporations had been won by Sinn Fein.
A subsequent issue of the Bulletin, that of 23rd January 1920, focussed attention on the victory of Nationalists (21 members) over Unionists (19 members) in the Derry City election. The significance of this victory was illustrated by a reference from the Dublin Evening Telegraph of 21st January, which affirmed that:
“the capture of Derry means much more than a victory in the domain of local politics. It is a symbol, the meaning of which can be neither ignored nor evaded by the inventors of a homogenous Ulster, the most notorious political fiction of our day… all over the area which Mr. Lloyd George proposes to stake out as the new State of Carsonia the same result has manifested itself. Lurgan, Dungannon, Carrickfergus, Larne, Limavady, Cookstown, Lisburn… have rejected Carson nomineesæ” (IB, 23 Jan. 1920).
The critical application of the Derry result to the proposed Home Rule Bill indicated that there was a growing awareness of the implications of the Bill which Long and Macpherson were trying to steer through the House of Commons. Arthur Griffith adverted to the significance of the Ulster vote in a cabled message to de Valera that—
“the people of Ireland, at the first opportunity of recording their Municipal votes, have hoisted the National Flag over Ireland’s city and town councils. Derry joins hands with Limerick in the unity of Ireland”.
This message was conveyed to a wider audience by the Irish Bulletin on 21st January 1920.
Despite the evidence of the polls—and the acceptance of them by the main body of the press—the British Government refused to acknowledge the verdict delivered in favour of Sinn Fein and attempted to cast doubts on its validity. Street (nb explain who Street was) exemplified the attitude adopted by the administration of Dublin Castle, when he wrote—
“these elections did not give a true indication of the real political aspirations of the people. By its methods of intimidation and propaganda Sinn Fein secured many votes which it would otherwise have lost, and certainly succeeded in preventing the recording of votes adverse to it” (Street, Admns. p70 [see below]).
No evidence was provided for this statement and no mention was made of the obstacles placed in the path of the democratic process by acts of intimidation conducted at the direction of Dublin Castle (Ibid., cf. Keiko Inoue, pp14,15 and comment by Roy Foster, p497; and Irish Councils For Irish Freedom {Sinn Fein publication} pp7-24 for IB and SF, giving number of councils won and not the Counties; and see also Maume and Phillip and Hart?? IB mention of percentage).
Faced by this vote in favour of Sinn Fein, Sir John Taylor cleverly attempted to displace it from the front pages of the newspapers by publishing on 19th January—the same day that the election results were declared—a Government White Paper entitled, Return Of Outrages Attributed To The Sinn Fein Movement From May 1st 1916 to December 31st 1919 (Eve. Tel., 20 Jan. 1920.)
This White Paper mirrored the earlier publication of such figures that had been issued in October 1919. The Irish Bulletin carefully and cleverly challenged these new figures—as it had done those of the previous October—and exposed them as black propaganda. A comprehensive response and a detailed rebuttal of the “attributed outrages” was published in the Irish Bulletin of 21st January. The figures from the White Paper were printed on one half of the page; the other half contained a list of figures of ‘Outrages committed by the armed forces of the English Government in Ireland’ for the same period. The Castle list recorded 20 murders by Sinn Fein; the Bulletin list recorded 59 murders by Crown Forces. The Castle List identified in total 1,529 outrages committed by Sinn Fein; the Bulletin identified 24,359 outrages committed by the Crown Forces (IB, 21 Jan.’20 — give chart).
Although the accuracy of both sets of figures may well be debated, Taylor’s White Paper was evidently designed to have a propaganda effect and to deflect public attention away from the election result. The Irish Bulletin made this clear by quoting extracts from the Dublin Evening Telegraph of 20th January. The Telegraph noted that the White Paper had been released to special correspondents rather than to the Irish press as a whole, and asked if it was “compiled with the object of providing much-needed ammunition for the batteries of anti-Irish papers” (Irish Bulletin, 21 Jan. 1920). It went on to suggest:
“The mere title of the paper is in itself sufficient for all who know the Castle and its ways. There is nothing to prove that the majority of the offences catalogued had anything to do with politics, and still less that they had any connection with Sinn Fein” (Irish Bulletin, 21 Jan. 1920).
Uncontested, the Dublin Castle White Paper presented to the world an image that was damaging to the cause of Sinn Fein—and it was used for that purpose by Street, when he published it later in 1920 as unquestionable fact. Indeed Street’s conclusion was that the election result was responsible for “the intensifying of the campaign of murder and outrage” (IO [Intelligence Officer], Administration Of Ireland?? pp70.72—figure broken down into provinces; Hart’s stats?)
By providing a comprehensive alternative view to Castle propaganda—the cold, hard facts as Gallagher called them—the Bulletin provided the world-wide press with material to raise doubts about British policy in Ireland and to portray Sinn Fein in a positive light. This information continued to be of great value to the Irish Republican mission in America
The American Connection
De Valera and members of his mission immediately recognised the value of the election results and of the crime statistics. On 30th January Harry Boland wrote with the request that “we are particularly anxious to secure the results of the Municipal elections” (Extract from letter of Harry Boland, 30 Jan.’20, DE 2/81, NAI). This letter was only received on 9th March. By this time a separate request, “to keep us in touch with the present situation in Ireland”, had been attended to by Robert Brennan—who had sent “a complete file of Daily Bulletins“ and a list of “attributed outrages” to America on 14th February. Brennan also enclosed some details of the election results (DO’H to DF, 14 Feb.’20, DE 2/10, NAI).
The analysis of the election results took rather longer to complete. Diarmuid O’Hegarty sent Frank Gallagher the detailed results of the January elections and asked him to analyse them “for publication and propaganda abroad” (D.O’H to FG, 20 March, ’20, ibid. ?? check these letters).
Following the arrest of Gallagher, Robert Brennan produced a comprehensive analysis of the results and published them in the Irish Bulletin of 17th May 1920. He informed O’Hegarty that it was “the best I could make” of the figures. (Brennan to D.O’H, 18 May ’20, ibid.)
In the month of January the mood in de Valera’s camp was positive. Harry Boland informed Michael Collins on 13th January that the Bond Drive should succeed and that there was “wonderful progress of the movement”. He also referred to the possibility of sending Thompson machine guns to Ireland (Boland to Collins, 13 Jan. 1920, de Valera Papers, 1665). On 17th January de Valera received the Freedom of New York City and the Bond Drive, with de Valera’s name inscribed on the forms as President of the Irish Republic, was launched.
The many Irish-American newspapers were still promoting Ireland’s interests, and de Valera’s speeches were widely reported in all the American press as he toured the States of America. By word and by mouth Americans were informed of Ireland’s claim to recognition as a Republic and of England’s misrule in Ireland.
Beneath the apparently unified momentum of the Irish movement, there were, however, still signs of difference between de Valera’s followers and those of Devoy and Cohalan. These were to surface later in dramatic and damaging form after de Valera gave an interview to the Westminster Gazette on 5th February 1920, which was published on the following day.
For the moment developments in Ireland were shaken by the intervention of Michael Collins and his Squad. ?? link this American theme with one below
Intervention Of The Squad
The battle for minds that was central to the debate on the Elections and the Crime statistics was shattered on 21st January, when, in the midst of the arguments, Second Assistant Commissioner of the DMP, William Redmond, was shot dead in Dublin. The man, whom Lord French had hoped would counter the threat presented by Michael Collins and his Squad, was gunned down by members of that very Squad in Harcourt Street, the centre of Dail Eireann and Sinn Fein activity.
The operation was directed by Mick McDonnell; the shooting was carried out by Paddy Daly (Tim Pat Coogan, Michael Collins, London, 1990, p129; Vincent Byrne, Witness Statement 423, p21, Military Archives, Cathal Brugha Barracks).
Information gleaned by Collins from inside the G division of the DMP not only provided him with knowledge about the movements of Redmond, but also enabled him to uncover the identity of an Intelligence Agent recently sent on a special mission to Dublin by Sir Basil Thomson in his capacity as head of the Directorate of Intelligence (O’Halpin, Fisher, p922, where he gives three terms for the role that Thomson performed as Assistant-Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police: the other two categories were ‘special branch’ and ‘secret service’).
The Intelligence Agent, calling himself Jameson, but whose real name was John Charles Byrne, proved a most dangerous adversary. After winning the confidence of Art O’Brien in London, he came to Dublin and had even managed to obtain a private interview with Michael Collins in early December 1919. It was almost certainly from Byrne’s report of this meeting that Thomson had been able to inform Macpherson on 19th December 1919 from “an absolutely trustworthy source” of the central role of Collins in organising the assassination of policemen. Walter Long described ‘Jameson’ as “the best secret service man we ever had”.
Having proved beyond doubt that he was a spy, the agent was shot dead by the Squad on 2nd March 1920 in Dublin. Some weeks later, on 25th March 1920, another Intelligence Agent, Fergus Brian Mulloy, was killed by the Squad in Wicklow Street, Dublin (Julian Putkowski, The Best Secret Service Man We Had —Jack Byrnes, A2 and the IRA, Lobster, p19; and p30 for Long 31st May 1920 from Tom Jones no page; Coogan, Collins, pp127-131, and pp133,134 for Mulloy; Abbot, Police, pp53-55: but gives 2nd April for death; spells Thomson with ‘p;’ and ascribes quote re. ‘best’ to Thomson instead of Long).
This penetration of the British Crown Forces at the highest level also pertained in Cork, where Florence O’Donoghue, the head of Intelligence of Cork Number 1 Brigade, had infiltrated the British Army to a remarkable degree. O’Donoghue was in almost daily contact with Michael Collins. Not only was he on very friendly terms with Josephine Marchement-Brown, a secretary in General Strickland’s office, whom he married before the Truce, but also he was in possession of the cypher of the RIC which revealed the key to their cabled messages. By using these sources of information, O’Donoghue confirmed that Thomas Quinlisk, a former member of Casement’s Irish Brigade, was working for British Intelligence. Having attempted to infiltrate Collins’s spy network in Dublin, Quinlisk visited Cork and was shot as a spy on 18th February 1920 (Boland Diary, 25 Jan. 1920 for Collins praising Quinlisk, and 10 Feb. ’20 met Mrs. Quinlisk? a lso Cork thesis Borgonovo).
Brennan and Gallagher did not feature news of these killings in the pages of the Irish Bulletin. The assassination of individual policemen and Intelligence Officers was a sensitive issue, even among members of the IRA and of Dail Eireann. Justified by Collins and others as an intrinsic part of the reality of war in the battle for survival, it was calculated to be of negative publicity value. Instead the Irish Bulletin, as did their counter-parts in British propaganda, focussed on the atrocities of their enemies and on the positive claims of their own cause. British intelligence agents, such as Byrne and Quinlisk, were never acknowledged by their employers. ?? An t Oglach and killings??
(To be continued)
Major C.J.C. Street: The Administration Of Ireland, 1920; with a substantial extract from his Ireland In 1921 and a review of his other writings on Britain’s world role, and inter-war Europe. Introduction by Dr. Pat Walsh. Intelligence Officer Street produced this exceptionally informative justification of the Black and Tan War in Ireland, using the secret archives of Dublin Castle (with many captured IRA documents and officials statistics of incidents.) 192pp (9.5″ x 6″). Index, Bibliog. ISBN 0 85034 089 6. AB, 2001. €18, £15
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