(Series 9)
The Evolution Of British Policy And The Emergence Of A Sinn Fein Publicity Department
In The Years After The Easter Rising.
Mss notes, Part 33
Ireland at the end of May 1920
Surveying the scene in Ireland at the end of May, General Macready was not a happy man. That the Irish Bulletin and Childers might attack the conduct of the Government was one thing; that Sir Horace Plunkett, a member of the Privy Council of Ireland which had sworn him in to office, had attacked it was quite another. On 22nd May 1920, the day the Irish Statesman article appeared, Macready wrote to Sir Hamar Greenwood on the matter of propaganda. He began by—
“drawing his attention to a leaflet called The Irish Bulletin, issued by Sinn Fein broadcast, but especially to the French and American press, and urging that something should be done by way of counterblast, “sticking to essentials, and contradicting evident mis-statements, or supplying them with a context which would alter the whole atmosphere”…” (Macready, Annals, vol.11, p. 465)
At the end of the War, Macready lamented that nothing was done and acknowledged that the statements of Greenwood in the House of Commons “in no way weakened the case as put forward by Erskine Childers and other nimble and unscrupulous propagandists on the Sinn Fein side” (Macready, Annals, vol.11, p465).
Macready’s testimony to the strength of Sinn Fein propaganda speaks volumes for its efficacy, and his special mention of the role of Erskine Childers may be regarded as a merited tribute from a discerning adversary. However, Macready’s later complaint that nothing was done during the War to counter Sinn Fein propaganda fails to give adequate recognition, not only to the work of General Marians and others in his own department of the Army, but also to the work of Basil Clarke and H.B.C. Pollard which began in August 1920.
When Clarke and Pollard commenced their propaganda campaigns, the situation on the ground in Ireland, and the British Government’s response to it, had altered significantly since Fisher’s Report of May 1920. Moreover, the Sinn Fein propaganda machine had not been idle during that period (Boland Diary, 15 May 1920, de Valera Papers, 2172/1, UCDA).
The publication of the Irish Bulletin continued to revolve around Brennan and Gallagher, although there are indications that Gallagher began to play a more prominent part in its administration. On 22nd May 1920 he informed his fiancée that:
“I am day by day being given the really important work of the office to do. It must be A.G.’s (Arthur Griffith’s) instructions I think. Anyhow it isn’t by accident” (‘Harry O’Neill’ to Cecilia Saunders, 22 May 1920, Gallagher Papers 10050/108, Trinity. Ms Gallagher is ‘Harry O’Neill’).
On a personal level, Gallagher was greatly influenced by Childers and his wife, Molly, whom he was seeing frequently at this time. Molly discerned “a great power for good” in Gallagher, and informed him that “Erskine and I have such plans for the things that you are going to do” (Ibid., and Gallagher to Cecilia, 28 May 1920, Gallagher Papers 10050/109).
Childers, himself, continued to work on many fronts. Apart from spending a considerable amount of time on the development of the National Land Bank, he also cultivated his wide range of contacts. While remaining in close personal contact with the Propaganda Office and Arthur Griffith, he also met Lord Monteagle in relation to a Dominion Bill for Ireland, which he was to bring before the House of Lords, and he remained in touch with Sir Horace Plunkett.
Contacts were also made with George Russell (AE) and Lady Fingall. (Childers Diary, 13-31 May 1920, 7811, Trinity Ms). At the same time as he was associating with members of Plunkett’s Irish Dominion League, Childers met Wedgwood Benn while on a visit to Dublin on 21st May and had a long talk with him over Irish affairs.
Childers saw Benn again at the end of May, after Benn had toured the west of Ireland, and, on Benn’s return to England, Childers sent him, on 30th and 31st May, many questions to be asked in the House of Commons concerning the state of Ireland.
These questions, Childers maintained, were the result of a week’s work, especially an examination of the “official list of outrages” (Childers Diary, 21-31 May 1920, 7811, Trinity Ms). By this well-tried method, Childers and the Propaganda Department were able to put pressure on Sir Hamar Greenwood in the House of Commons.
In the early days of June, Childers was again much occupied with the National Land Bank.
A vivid reminder of the American dimension to the work of the Propaganda Department was provided on 28th May 1920, when Harry Boland, fresh from his arrival from America, visited the Irish Bulletin office. In the words of Robert Brennan:
“he breezed into Mount Street and gave us all a lively account of how he had been twice smuggled across the Atlantic. He had arrived, Brennan added, “only that morning and the first man to meet him was Michael Collins”…” (Brennan, Allegiance, p265).
Boland had important matters to discuss with Collins concerning guns and money but he also had a serious matter to raise with Brennan. He wanted him to come to America to act as Director of Propaganda for the American organisation. It was not a casual offer of a job. The proposal, which was formulated by de Valera, was formally presented to the Ministry of Dail Eireann by Boland on 5th June 1920.
De Valera proposed, in his first paragraph, that the Dail should appoint Consuls and Diplomatic Agents to seven European countries, and that four Diplomatic Agents be appointed to the cities of Chicago, New Orleans, San Francisco and Boston, “to act as organising directors of Irish opinion in these areas” (D. O’Hegarty to Eamon de Valera, 8 June 1920, NAI, DE 2/245 in Documents on Irish Foreign Policy, Vol.1, 1919-1922, p75).
De Valera then proposed—
“that a Director of Propaganda be sent to the United States to supply material for the Agents referred to in paragraph (1), and that the services of Mr R. O’Brennan be made available for that purpose” (Ibid, p75).
In reply to this proposal, the Ministry stated that—
“their propaganda could, for the present, be more efficiently carried on from Dublin, as far as the Continent of Europe is concerned, but they do not exclude the possibility of its being considered desirable, with the development of the Propaganda Department, to send a man to the United States in connection with this work” (Ibid, pp75,76).
Robert Brennan, in his account of Harry Boland’s offer of the position, gives the impression that he, himself, rejected the offer. However, the statement from the Ministry indicates that they were involved in the decision to retain Brennan in Ireland. (Brennan, Allegiance, p265; David Fitzpatrick, Harry Boland’s Irish Revolution, Cork, 2003, pp168,169).
De Valera’s sixth proposal concerned Erskine Childers. He requested that “Mr Erskine Childers be asked to take the post of Ambassador to the United States” (O’Hegarty to de Valera, 8 June 1920, NAI, DE 2/245: in Docms. of Irish Foreign Policy, p76).
This highly imaginative and bold proposal serves as a sign of the high regard that Childers was held, even at this time, by de Valera. The response of the Dail Ministry shows that it held him in similar esteem. It was stated that:
“the Ministry realise the importance of the post of Ambassador to the United States and the suitability of Mr Erskine Childers for the position, but they fear that, owing to the loss of Mr Barton, he is at present too valuable an asset to the constructive side of their work here to be allowed to leave Ireland” (Ibid, p76).
Both Childers and Brennan, therefore, remained in Ireland to continue their work for propaganda. While rejecting de Valera’s request for the two men, the Dail Ministry encouraged him to continue with his plans to present a formal demand for recognition of the Irish Republic to the President of the United States and agreed to ask Dail Eireann to sanction a grant of 1 million dollars for that purpose (Ibid, pp75,76. 1 million dollars were also granted to the Department of Defence).
Although neither Childers nor Brennan were to accompany Boland to America as de Valera had wished, they still continued to play a central role in providing propaganda material for the Irish mission to the States.
Both Childers and Brennan met Harry Boland on 18th June, shortly before he returned to America, and, on 21st June, Childers gave Brennan a revised version of his articles in the Daily News that might be used for publicity purposes in America. One of the main concerns of Childers in the early days of June was to find a publisher for these Daily News articles.
On a personal level, Childers was very anxious about the condition of his cousin, Robert Barton, who was still confined in Portland Gaol, and he paid a flying visit to him from 14th-17th June. The sight of Barton enduring harsh prison conditions seemed to stimulate Childers to increase his endeavours to make known, not only his cousin’s fate, but also that of Ireland under British rule (Childers’ Diary, 14-18 June 1920, 7811, Childers’ Papers, Trinity MS; Gallagher to Cecilia Saunders, 19th June 1920, Gallagher Papers, 10050/112; Trinity MS for mention of Childers visit to Barton).
Reviewing events from a propaganda perspective over the six month period from 31st November 1919 to 31st May 1920, Desmond FitzGerald’s report was positive. It was also extremely detailed and realistic.
Having stated that the cost of running the Department for that half yearly period was c£900, he recounted how copies of pamphlets, the Weekly List Of Acts Of Aggression, and the Irish Bulletin had made an impact—especially in Ireland, England, America, and France.
The main problem, Fitzgerald asserted, was—
“that as far as the outside world was concerned it was chiefly dependent upon the representatives of foreign papers living in London who were themselves dependent upon English sources for their news of Ireland” (Report On tThe Propaganda Department, Dublin, undated June 1920, in Documents On Irish Foreign Policy Vol.1, 1919-1922, Dublin, 1998, p69).
It was for this reason, FitzGerald stated, that he made some five visits to England during this period and had met over fourteen representatives from certain named countries. It was in this area of work that FitzGerald continued to make his own major contribution to the Propaganda Department.
FitzGerald discerned that, on providing the press representatives of foreign countries with copies of the Irish Bulletin, many articles dealing with the Irish situation in a friendly spirit had appeared in the papers of all these countries. He concluded that—
“I am entirely satisfied with the result of this work and with the general friendly spirit of the foreign press representatives” (Ibid, p70).
Communications with George Gavan Duffy in Paris, however, had made FitzGerald aware that the dependence of French Press Agencies upon their English counterpart was creating what he described as “an anti-Irish note” in the French papers (Ibid, p70). Indeed, the correspondence from Gavan Duffy and Sean T. O’Kelly made many references to the value and the problems of propaganda and contributed to FitzGerald’s awareness of the problems to be overcome.
In response to the problems of the French press, FitzGerald reported that he had immediately met the Editors of the French Press Agencies resident in London and had come up with a solution:
“The only way I saw of meeting this difficulty was for us to have the use of the private wire of one of the Dublin newspapers for some period daily and to forward news which we consider valuable for immediate distribution to these men in London”.
FitzGerald then declared that Martin FitzGerald of the Freeman’s Journal had allowed the Propaganda Department the use of the Freeman’s private wire to assist the Dail publicity (Ibid, p70).
This formal association with the Freeman’s Journal was an important development. By the end of May 1920, FitzGerald’s attention to detail and his wide range of influential contacts had made a major contribution to the effective distribution of the Irish Bulletin and to the dissemination of Irish propaganda.
Dail Eireann maintained an active interest in the work of the Propaganda Department and allocated £5,000 to it, at a special meeting of the Dail Ministry on 24th June (Meeting of Ministry, 24 June 1920, DE 1/2, NAI).
Some difficulties, however, and some limitations were to appear in the functioning of the Department, especially in England and America.
Writing from London on 12th July 1920, Art O’Brien asked Diarmuid O’Hegarty for clarification about the role of his office—
“because matters in connection with the propaganda department and the London Office seem to be developing in a somewhat unsatisfactory manner” (O’Brien to O’Hegarty, 12 July 1920, NAI DE 2/11 in Documents on Foreign Policy, p81).
While praising FitzGerald’s work with foreign correspondents as “very valuable”, and commending the setting up of a telegraphic news service, O’Brien expressed concern that his London Office was not consulted over the initiatives taken by the Propaganda Department:
“I understand DF’s [Desmond FitzGerald’s] opinion in this matter to be, after several discussions with him, that the propaganda department should work entirely on its own account, without regard or reference to anybody else. To my mind this spells confusion” (Ibid, pp81,82 nb possibly reference to AOB papers in NLI)
Serious illness during the early months of 1920, and frustration that the frequent visits of FitzGerald to London did not permit him the same independence as O’Kelly and Duffy, may have contributed to O’Brien’s feelings of pique.
However, his differences with FitzGerald did not impede the work of propaganda abroad. Gavan Duffy from Paris and Sean T. O’Kelly from Rome continued to direct active programmes of propaganda and to inform the Dail of developments in their respective countries. Audiences of O’Kelly and Count Plunkett with Pope Benedict XV in May 1920—during which month the beatification of Oliver Plunkett took place—illustrated the degree of influence that O’Kelly and Mgr. Hagan exercised at the Vatican (Dermot Keogh, The Vatican, The Bishops And Irish Politics 1919-1939, Cambridge, 1986, pp41-46) ?Plunkett audience
Difficulties also appeared in America. Despite the grand design of de Valera for an expansion of the propaganda work of the Dail in the States, the divisions between his mission to America and the organisations loyal to Devoy and Cohalan continued to take away from a clear and forceful statement of Ireland’s claims to recognition.
This division manifested itself at the National Conventions of the Republican and Democratic parties, prior to the Presidential Election, in June and July 1920 (Alan J. Ward, Ireland And Anglo-American Relations 1899-1921, London, 1969, pp220,221).
At the Republican Convention in Chicago in June de Valera’s proposal for an Irish plank in the Democratic election programme, which he made to the Sub-Committee of the Resolutions Committee, was opposed by Cohalan. De Valera pushed for recognition of an Irish Republic; Cohalan favoured a resolution of Self-Determination for Ireland.
De Valera’s proposal was rejected by 12 votes to 1: Cohalan’s proposal, while accepted by 7 votes to 6, was not acted upon. (Report On Split In Clan 1919-1920, McGarrity Papers, 17521(1), NLI; Draft Minutes of Meeting, 8 June 1920, de Valera Papers, 1684, Killiney; Lavelle, James O’Mara, pp169,170) ?? add covered in Irish and English papers
At the Democratic Convention at San Francisco in July, following the adoption of an Irish plank which referred only to Self-Determination, The Times commented that—
“this comparative conservatism is due to the complete failure of Mr De Valera and his cohorts here, as well as at Chicago” (The Times, 5 July 1920, reporting Washington Correspondent of 3 July 1920).
Against this background of internal feuding and the failure to unite on an agreed policy for Ireland, the efforts to advance Ireland’s claims by propaganda were adversely affected. Dr. Patrick McCartan sadly observed that both sides saw clearly the connection between the Cohalan/de Valera Chicago fight and the intensification of the British atrocity campaign in Ireland.
Nevertheless, each rushed to defend its chief:
“We formed into camps of de Valeraites and Cohalanites, each denouncing the other for the ruin of our hopes—to the scandal of America and our own degradation. And while our frenzy lasted we forgot Ireland” (McCartan, With De Valera In America, p198).
McCartan acknowledged that—
“by our fighting we had shattered our power to influence the American Government to restrain England’s murderous intent and that the only defence against extermination now left to the Irish was the valour of her sons, the matchless men of the army of the Republic of Ireland” (Ibid).
Privately there was an increase in activity to supply the IRA with arms; publicly, despite the divisions in the Irish ranks, there were attempts to persuade the United States administration to recognise Ireland’s claims for independence.
Official statements by Dail Eireann were quick to support the stand taken by de Valera and were slow to acknowledge the reality on the ground as discerned by McCartan. The report by Count Plunkett, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, made to a private meeting of Dail Eireann on 29th June, referred briefly to the Republican Convention at Chicago.
Plunkett then stated that his report “would be incomplete”, if mention was not made of the attitude of Judge Cohalan and John Devoy towards de Valera, and he declared that “these men have never given their whole-hearted support to the President in his campaign” (Dail Eireann Report on Foreign Affairs, June 1920, DE 4/1/3, NAI in Documents on Irish Foreign Policy, vol.1, 1919-1922, p72; Foreign Affairs Report to Dail Eireann, 29 June 1920, DE 2/269, NAI; Minutes of Dail Eireann for 29th June 1920 refers to, but does not give, this Report).
Plunkett concluded that—
“the President has definitely refused to allow his judgement or his actions to be dictated by these men, and the success of his tour and of the Bond Drive are a proof of his wisdom in this matter” (Ibid.; see also Report of Foreign Affairs, 29 June 1920, Gavan Duffy Papers, 15439(7), NLI; and Kathleen McKenna Napoli Papers, 22605, NLI).
In a highly unusual intervention of the Dail on 25th January 1921, all of these remarks were deleted, leaving only a short paragraph to describe American affairs at this time. The paragraph read:
“the stand taken by the President is that the policy and action of the Irish people must be decided in Ireland” (Ibid, p73).
On 29th June 1920, a statement to the Dail by Arthur Griffith as Acting-President also spelled out the success of de Valera’s mission: “In America the work accomplished by the President had been extraordinary”, adding that de Valera “had wielded the Irish Race into a United Force”.
Making special reference to propaganda, Griffith asserted that—
“…the propaganda carried on against Ireland on the Continent and America during the last seven months had been very virulent”.
And he concluded that “the Propaganda Department had done wonderful work in counteracting this campaign” (Dail Eireann, Minutes of Proceedings, 29 June 1920, p170).
The meeting of the Dail closed by sending a message to de Valera expressing—
“complete satisfaction with the work you have performed and relies with confidence upon the Great American Nation to accord recognition to the Republic of Ireland now in fact and in law established” (Ibid, p186).
This message, with its aspirational vision of the Irish Republic as established “in fact”, was signed by Griffith, as Acting-President, and by J.J. O’Kelly, as Chairman of the Dail.
Following the statements of Griffith and Plunkett on 29th June 1920, Dail Eireann approved of several motions to promote Ireland’s interests in America and throughout the world. Many of these proposals were closely linked to the advancement of propaganda, and to the motions presented by Harry Boland to the Dail Ministry on de Valera’s behalf on 5th June.
It was agreed that de Valera should be authorised to spend up to half a million dollars in connection with the American election campaign and further agreed that he might spend up to one million dollars “to obtain the Recognition of the Irish Republic by the Government of the United States” (Dail Eireann, Minutes of Proceedings, 29 June 1910, p.173)
Proposals were then approved to appoint, in certain countries, a number of consular and diplomatic agents. Among the countries named were Russia, France, Spain, Italy, Austria, Germany, Denmark, and Switzerland.
By a special amendment, provision was made for representatives to be sent to Egypt and India (Ibid, p173).
It was also agreed that the Ministry might appoint an Ambassador to Washington and send a Diplomatic Mission to Russia. The positive response by the Dail to these proposals on 29th June showed, not only that it had confidence in de Valera’s policy in America, but also that it was prepared to undertake an imaginative expansion in the work of propaganda.
(To be continued)
