The Evolution Of British Policy And The Emergence Of A Sinn Fein Publicity Department

In The Years After The Easter Rising.

Mss Notes, Part 31

A New British Administration, May 1920  

The appointment of Hamar Greenwood to succeed Ian Macpherson as Chief Secretary on 2nd April 1920, and the arrival in Ireland of General Macready to succeed General Shaw on 14th April 1920, did not mark the end of new appointments;  rather they were the first changes in a radical overhaul of the Irish administration.  While Macready was being sworn in to office at a meeting of the Privy Council, Sir John Taylor, who attended the swearing-in ceremony, was preparing to leave his post of Assistant Under Secretary (Memo. of Joseph Brennan, 19 April 1920, Brennan Papers, 26164, NLI).  

Even before the decisive meeting of Taylor with Lord French and Macready on 19th April and the restoration to MacMahon of his previous powers, French had recommended to Bonar Law that a committee of investigation be sent over to Ireland to examine the grave condition of the Dublin Castle administration.  On 17th April, Law informed French that his proposal was “a very good one” (Bonar Law to French, 17 April 1920, French Papers, 75/46/12, IWM).

At the same time General Macready, writing from Ireland on 23rd April, bluntly informed Long that—

“before I had been here three days, I was honestly flabbergasted at the administrative chaos that seems to reign here…” (Macready to Long, 23 April 1920, Lloyd George Papers, F/34/1/19, House of Lords).  

After consultations between Long and Bonar Law, it was resolved that Sir Warren Fisher, Chief of the Civil Service, should head a Committee of Inquiry into the management of Dublin Castle (Long to Law, 27 April 1920, Bonar Law Papers, 103/5/3; Fisher to Law, 27 April 1920, Bonar Law Papers, 103/2/17, House of Lords ?? earlier report in Jan.)  

Fisher travelled over to Ireland with Sir Hamar Greenwood on 6th May 1920 and, assisted by two colleagues, Alfred (‘Andy’) Cope and R.E. Harwood, he began his investigation into the state of the Dublin Castle administration (French Diary, 6 May 1920, French Papers, 75/46/3, IWM; Wheeler Bennett, Lord Waverly, pp47-82).

On the very day that Fisher’s team arrived in Dublin, 6th May, Lloyd George informed Bonar Law that he was suffering from a breakdown and had been advised to take ten days rest  (Lloyd George to Law, 6 May 1920, Lloyd George Papers, F/31/1/27, House of Lords).  Although Lloyd George was able to make his views known to Bonar Law, telling him, for example, on 10th May that Ireland was a disgrace to the Empire and that Macready should be given every assistance to win the War, he was not able to be present at the meetings which shaped the detailed policy (Lloyd George to Law, 10 May 1920, Bonar Law Papers, 103/4/2, House of Lords)   

Before Fisher reported on the civil administration, Greenwood and Macready, acting in unison, and dealing directly with Bonar Law, had taken steps to improve the functioning of the army and police (Greenwood to Law, 8 May 1920, Bonar Law Papers, 103/3/1, House of Lords).  Their requests were partially met at a conference on Ireland on 11th May, when it was resolved that, as far as was possible, Macready’s request for troops would be met.  It was also agreed that a “special officer” should be appointed to co-ordinate the activities of the RIC and DMP, and another “first rate intelligence officer” was also be appointed (Sheila Lawlor, Britain And Ireland 1914-1923, Dublin, 1983, pp56,57 and passim for valuable source material).  

These decisions were to lead to the appointments of General Tudor on 15th May as Police Adviser, and of Colonel Ormonde Winter as Director of Intelligence for the Crown Forces. ?? sources see Townshend see Hopkinson.

At the Conference on Ireland on 11th May 1920, it was also proposed that—

“a special body of Ex-Service men here in England should be enlisted, on special terms, as gendarmerie to be used in Ireland” (Bonar Law to Lloyd George, 11 May 1920, Lloyd George Papers, F/31/1/30, House of Lords).  

A similar scheme had been implemented at the start of the year and had seen the creation of the ‘Black and Tans’.  This proposal of 11th May, which was to lead to the creation of the Auxiliary Cadet Corps, was initiated by General Sir Henry Wilson, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, and supported by Winston Churchill, Secretary of State for War.  It was an attempt to modify Macready’s request for eight new battalions of some 8,000 men by providing the men by other means.  Wilson was anxious to preserve the ranks of the army for possible use in India, Egypt and other parts of the Empire. (Martin Gilbert, World In Torment, Winston S. Churchill 1917-1922, pp450,451).   

Although Macready was aware of the need for a political solution to the situation in Ireland, he was also anxious that the army should be strong enough to preserve law and order.   The Conference on 11th May, while not meeting his full demands, afforded him promises of support and provided new structures for the future, both for the army and the police to conduct the War.  

The Fisher Report was designed to bring about a similar renewal in the Dublin Castle administration. 

 Sir Warren Fisher presented his report on Ireland on 12th May 1920, and enclosed a Memorandum that had been drawn up by Cope and Harwood.  Fisher’s Report was damning:  “the Castle administration”, he stated firmly, “does not administer”.  He maintained that the structure was “obsolete”, and that. in the sphere—

“of informing and advising the Irish Government in relation to policy and of practical capacity in the application of policy it simply has no existence” (Sir Warren Fisher Report, point one, 12 May 1920, Lloyd George Papers, F/31/1/32, House of Lords).  

Four years on from the Royal Commission on the Rebellion in Ireland, it was as if nothing had changed!  

The words of Fisher were reminiscent of the findings of the Hardinge Commission in 1916 that the Irish administration was “anomalous in quiet times and almost unworkable in times of crisis” (Wheeler Bennett, Anderson, p58 ?? see original Royal Commission).  

This general conclusion was accompanied by particular recommendations.  Both the Report and recommendations would appear to have been based on the longer, sixteen-point Memorandum of Cope and Harwood.   

 Their Memorandum, while critical of James MacMahon, the Under-Secretary, favoured his retention in Office.  It did not, however, make the same recommendation for Sir John Taylor.  Remarking that Taylor was on leave during their inspection, they reported that—

“he had taken upon himself the entire administration of the Division to the exclusion of the Under Secretary.  He would appear to have exceptional working capacity but it would be impossible for any single individual, however capable, to deal adequately with the quantity of intricate business which he insists upon retaining in his own hands.”

The Memorandum also noted that Taylor was “highly unpopular”, and concluded that it would, “without any disparagement of his work as a distinguished official, be in the public interest if a change were made” (Confidential Memorandum to Sir Warren Fisher, point seven, 12 May 1920, Lloyd George Papers, F/31/1/32, House of Lords).  

Cope and Harwood also reported that Duggan and Brennan (Christian names), two of Taylor’s critics, “impressed us favourably”.  

Their findings do much to confirm the view of Sinn Fein, as expressed in the Irish Bulletin, that the presence and power that Taylor enjoyed at Dublin Castle had been a major obstacle to political progress. 

Cope and Harwood also referred to the relationship between the police and the army and, here again, their findings supported the Sinn Fein view that the police were an integral part of the military campaign:  

“Certainly the Military, through the competent military authority appear to be in de facto possession of control.  Searching’s of dwelling houses are authorised and carried out by them and the Police merely assist to the extent of identifying the persons and premises it is desired to search” (Conf. Memo., point nine, Ibid.)  

Mr. Smith, the Inspector General of the RIC, lent further weight to this view when he informed Cope and Harwood that: 

“…he understood that up to the present it had been the policy of the Government to effect reprisals in cases where outrages had been committed, the procedure followed being that the Military selected from lists in their possession, persons who were known at one time or another to have been officers of the Irish Volunteers…” (Conf. Memo., point 13, ibid.)   

Smith, having made the significant admission of reprisals by the military, then added that—

“the Police would be asked to accompany the soldiers to identify the persons selected, the military then making the arrests.  The prisoners were lodged in the civil gaol under the Warrant of the Competent Military Authority for the district until the question of prosecution or internment had been determined” (Conf. Memo., point 13, ibid.)  

Faced by this information, Cope and Harwood concluded that the Chief Secretary’s office should have a special department to deal with Police administration and that the opinions of the Law Adviser and the Crown Solicitor should be respected (Conf. Memo., point 10, ibid.)  They further recommended that Smith, who had been specially selected to replace Byrne, was not up to the task of directing the RIC. 

Sir Warren Fisher built on the Memorandum of Cope and Harwood.  Where they had suggested a change in personnel, he made precise recommendations as to who should assume Office in the new Dublin Castle administration.  He was in no doubt that, while retaining MacMahon, there should be an additional Under-Secretary and that  Sir John Anderson, KCB, Chairman of the Board of Inland Revenue, would be quite admirable and “would rapidly acquire the real control” (Sir Warren Fisher Report, point five, 12 May 1920, ibid).  

To replace Sir John Taylor in the post of Assistant Under Secretary, Fisher recommended that one of his investigating team, A.W. Cope, Second Secretary of the Ministry of Pensions, should be loaned to the Irish Office.   

Fisher supplemented this Report on 15th May 1920 with, what he termed, “a few ideas of a general character”.  These ‘ideas’ verged on the revolutionary:  he suggested the abolition of the position of Lord Lieutenant;  he questioned the present Home Rule Bill as having “no friends in Ireland”; he was critical of the Government of Ireland “as almost woodenly stupid and quite devoid of imagination”; and he proposed that “the prescription of Sinn Fein as such should be publicly abrogated”.  

These “ideas of a general character”, which would have found favour with many Sinn Feiners, were accompanied by a criticism of both the application of DORA and the influence of the Ascendancy party in Irish affairs (Fisher to Bonar Law, 15 May 1920, Lloyd George Papers, F/31/1/33, House of Lords and enclosing copy of report;  cf. Eunan O’Halpin, Sir Warren Fisher and the Coalition 1919-1922, The Historical Journal, 24.4., 1981 for valuable overview of Sir Warren Fisher).

Fisher, however, was not making a case for a Sinn Fein solution to the Irish problem!  It was his belief that—

“the nationalists and moderate Sinn Feiners would apparently be content with something on the lines of Dominion Home Rule”,

and he wanted to create an atmosphere, far removed from armed conflict and proscription, where such a development might be possible (Ibid).  He was also confident that, if —

“General Macready and Sir John Anderson are associated in this task, I entertain no doubt of eventual success, provided there is sufficient strength in Ministerial and Parliamentary circles to be patient” (Ibid).  

It was Bonar Law, acting in consultation with Austen Chamberlain and Greenwood, who decided to implement the broad thrust of Fisher’s Report (Chamberlain Minute to Bonar Law, 12 May 1920, Lloyd George Papers, F/31/132, House of Lords;  Bonar Law to Greenwood and Greenwood to Bonar Law, 14 and 16 May 1920, Bonar Law Papers, 103/3/8 and 103/3/9, House of Lords).

Significantly, however, Bonar Law did not respond to Fisher’s criticism of the Home Rule Bill, and Walter Long was left in control of a policy that favoured the Unionist and Ascendancy party of which Fisher had been so critical.  Nor did Bonar Law respond in any way to Fisher’s more radical proposal in regard to the Lord Lieutenant.  

As a result two Generals, French as Lord Lieutenant and Wilson as Chief of the Imperial General Staff, both of whom had been sympathetic to the Unionist position at the time of the Curragh mutiny, remained in positions of great influence  (??check see books on both).

(To be continued)

Brian Murphy