The evolution of British policy and the emergence of a Sinn Fein Publicity Department in the years after the Easter Rising.
Mss notes, Part 30
Further Changes In Dublin Castle
The attention of British officialdom was also drawn to Dublin Castle as a result of the meeting of William Wylie with Lord French. As recounted by Wylie, French asked him “who can I trust in the Castle?” Wylie replied: “Trust Mr. MacMahon… trust him and he won’t let you down. He has forgotten more about Ireland than the rest of them will ever know” (O’Broin, Wylie, pp53,54). For Lord French—who, almost from the very first, had linked MacMahon’s Catholic religion with disloyalty and had given his complete confidence to Sir John Taylor—this information from Wylie, a northern Presbyterian, must have come as something of a shock. French, however, was prepared to act on Wylie’s advice. He was also probably influenced by the need to respond to the new changes in the Irish administration.
Lord French’s diary substantiates Wylie’s recollections: it records meetings with Taylor and Wylie on 16th and 17th April 1920—which presaged further meetings with Macready and MacMahon on 18th and 19th April. The meeting of 19th April 1920 marked the end of Taylor’s primacy at Dublin Castle. MacMahon was informed by French, in the presence of Macready and Taylor, that he was to exercise his full powers as Under Secretary: including certain branches of the Department which had been specifically assigned to Taylor by Lord French on 9th January 1920 (Lord French Diary, 14-19 April 1920, French Papers 75/46/3, IWM).
Taylor, on leaving the meeting, immediately wrote to Lord French requesting him to “embody in a minute what you were kind and generous enough to say to me this morning as to the manner in which I have performed my duties since January last” (Taylor to French, 19 April 1920, French Papers 75/46/9 was 75/46/12, IWM). Taylor was concerned that the diminution in his authority should not adversely affect his career record. In particular, he wished that his reputation should not be tarnished by, what he termed: “a Press vendetta against me”, especially the claim by the special correspondent of the Daily News that he was primarily responsible for “advising and directing whatever repressive measures the inner Cabinet may contemplate” (Ibid).
The reply of Lord French, while attributing some praise to Taylor, also contained qualifications which tended to confirm, rather than deny, the claims made against Taylor by the Daily News and others of a nationalist viewpoint:
“I should do you less than justice if I did not place on record that your great courage, your devoted loyalty, your high sense of duty and your power of work have won my unstinting admiration…”
However he added:
“…if I have any criticism at all to make upon one who has proved himself such a true and faithful servant to his King and country, it would be that you may be apt to credit yourself with what one would call super-human powers of work; and the only regret with which I look back to the four months in which we have worked together is that you have probably overtaxed your strength, great as it is, by not availing yourself of adequate assistance…” (French to Taylor, 23 April 1920, French Papers 75/46/9, IWM)
It was significant that, even in a private letter to Taylor, French felt obliged to place on record some words of critical reproof! Further scrutiny of the Dublin Castle regime was called for when Greenwood, the new Chief Secretary, and General Macready, the new Commander-in-Chief, took up their posts. The views of Dail Eireann and Sinn Fein about the Dublin Castle administration and, in particular, the position of Sir John Taylor were well known; it was time for an official verdict.
Irish Bulletin And Childers
While enquiries into the Dublin Castle regime were taking place, the Publicity Department of Dail Eireann maintained its defence of republican ideals and institutions and continued its attack on British policy in Ireland. Frank Gallagher was able to lend his ability to the work of the Irish Bulletin staff, but it took some time before he was fully recovered from the Hunger Strike. On 21st April he informed Cecilia Saunders that he was back in his office, and told her that “my hope and desire during the strike was that you should not have known of it or at least of the seriousness of it” (FG to CS 21 April 1920, FG 10050/103, Trinity).
When Cecilia met Frank Gallagher in early May 1920, while he was convalescing in Dundrum, at the home of Anna Fitzsimmons and Mrs Golden. She found him to be very thin and pale, “but he was much better than I expected” (CS Diary, FG 10055, 8 May 1920, Trinity Ms). Soon afterwards Cecilia returned home to Cork, and Frank moved into a flat in Lower Pembroke Street. By that time he was able to engage fully in publicity work. (August met in Dublin and ordination of Dick??)
On 26th April 1920 the Irish Bulletin was prompted into explaining something of the scale of that publicity work by an article in the Morning Post. This alleged that—
“the British public know little enough of what is really happening in Ireland, because no newspaper correspondent, unless he is a Sinn Feiner, is safe in that country (Irish Bulletin, 26 April 1920, citing Morning Post, 23 April 1920).
The Bulletin rebutted that claim by stating that:
“within the last few months in addition to two special correspondents from the Morning Post (one of whom spent much of his time inside Sinn Fein headquarters where he was always courteously received) special correspondents have visited Ireland from the Manchester Guardian and the following London papers”
“Daily News, Daily Mail, Daily Herald, Daily Express, The Times, Sunday Chronicle, Daily Chronicle, Daily Telegraph, Sunday Times, Weekly Despatch, Daily Graphic, Daily Sketch, Daily Mirror and the English Review” (Irish Bulletin, 26 April, 1920)
To this comprehensive list of newspaper correspondents—who had all been well received and lived in safety—the Bulletin added the names of foreign correspondents. Among these were:
J.S. Steele, William Butler, J. McStuart, and Mr Getty, all from the United States; M. de Marsillac and M. Jean Vignaud from France; Sr. Liugi Grovaneli??, Italy; C.P. Bryan, Australia; Haakon Overland, Norway; and Friis Moller, Denmark.
The Bulletin added that, apart from these individuals, many other representatives of the foreign press had visited Ireland regularly during the preceding six months—including correspondents from Greece, Spain, South America, and Czecho-Slovakia. Possibly with tongue in cheek, the Bulletin concluded: “no casualties have been reported among them” (Irish Bulletin, 26 April 1920). The sheer number of journals listed—and the high calibre of the individual correspondents—spoke volumes for the efficacy of the Dail Eireann publicity work: A work—as Childers reminded his readers in the Daily News on 27th April—that was carried out under extreme duress.
Surprisingly, in the light of intelligence implications, Childers was emboldened to name those responsible for the propaganda work. He declared that the “literary and propagandist side has had a peculiar interest for me”, without actually declaring his part in it, continuing:
“and I wish all my readers could see and know the three able young men principally responsible for it— Desmond Fitzgerald, MP (the dramatist), Robt.(sic) Brennan, and Frank Gallagher—and thus realise the grotesque falsity of the Government’s allegation that in [harassing] the persons of these three men, all of them devoted to literary work, they are attacking “crime”…” (Childers, Military Rule, p29, from Daily News of 27th April).
Childers maintained that what the Government was attacking—
“and with pitiless persistence, …the expression of opinion. All three have been periodically in gaol, periodically raided, robbed of their papers, and harassed in every way. Gallagher nearly died in the recent prison hunger-strike. The other two are hiding from arrest…” (Ibid).
Perhaps it was understandable that, as FitzGerald, Brennan and Gallagher scanned the Daily News of 27th April 1920 for a telling extract for the Irish Bulletin, they refrained from drawing further attention to themselves. They did, however, select a passage from the article by Childers to illustrate his contention that the real object of the Government’s attack was not, as it claimed, crime, but, rather, the nascent institutions of a national movement. The Irish Bulletin of 28th April reproduced the opinion of Childers that—
the Irish Executive, under the pretext of dealing with crime which they themselves have provoked and imitated, …are engaged in hunting down the personnel and wrecking the machinery of a great democratic movement for national regeneration. Just as they are training your soldiers, to your and their disgrace, in burglary and sabotage, so in a wider field they are methodically engaged in the sabotage of a nation” (Irish Bulletin, 28 April 1920; Childers, Military Rule, pp 26,27).
Childers cited the Irish Executive crime of arresting those who were democratically elected in December 1918 and in January 1920, and—speaking from his experience as Director of the National Land Bank—he attacked its War on the constructive government of the Dail Eireann Ministries, on the economic revival of the Sinn Fein banks, and on native Irish industries, concluding: “It is, I repeat, the sabotage of a nation” (Childers, Military Rule, p31).
Often addressing his words to English readers personally, in such terms as “your soldiers”, “your responsibility”, the articles by Childers almost demanded a response!
These articles by Childers, most of which were re-produced in the Irish Bulletin, found their way to America, where the fragile base for co-operation between the de Valera and Devoy supporters was further tested in the month of April.
Propaganda In America And Boland’s Visit To Ireland
On 10th April, James O’Mara—who had been prevailed upon to remain in control of the Bond Drive—became involved in a dispute with Diarmuid Lynch, himself a TD, who was secretary to the Friends of Irish Freedom. The row, which had been simmering for some time, centred around the financial contribution of the Victory Fund, controlled by Devoy and the Friends of Irish Freedom, to de Valera’s Bond Drive (James O’Mara to D. Lynch, 10 April 1920, DE 5/57/14, NAI and other letters on the issue).
After what Boland referred to as “a hell of a row” on 13th April 1920, Lynch resigned from the Dail and committed himself to the policy of Devoy (Boland Diary, 13 April 1920, 2172/1, de Valera Papers, UCDA).
By the end of the month the political divisions were threatening the unity of the military organisation of the Irish republican movement. Correspondence between Boland and Collins expressed concern over the relationship of the Irish-based Supreme Council of the IRB, of which Collins was President, with the Revolutionary Directory of Clan na Gael, of which Devoy was head (Collins to Boland, 26 April 1920, de Valera Papers, 1665, UCDA. Note: abbreviations re. the Clan: RD stands for Revolutionary Directory; VC stands for the Clan or United Brotherhood).
These divisions, however, did not prevent de Valera from taking initiatives of his own to publicise Ireland’s claim to independence. On 28th April, on the occasion of Sir Auckland Geddes taking up his post as British Ambassador to America, de Valera informed President Wilson that Dr Patrick McCartan was the “only ambassador accredited by Ireland to the United States”. He then lodged a formal protest against Sir Auckland Geddes “representing Ireland” (Boland to Secy. of State, 5 May 1920, de Valera Papers, 1682, UCDA confirming telegram of 28 April. ?? McCartan soon to leave).
De Valera’s letter was a clever appeal to President Wilson to act upon the principles that he had espoused before the Peace Conference:
“In the Peace Conference these ideals were thrust aside. There Your Excellency had to struggle against the powerful interest of European states and the selfish ambitions of European statesmen. Here you are in your own proper domain. Here it is a question of America alone. Here your own will is final. Action is consonant with the war aims of the United States as proclaimed by you and will bring back hope to a world almost in despair” (President Of Irish Republic Repudiates The Claim Of The British Ambassador, in de Valera, Ireland’s Claim For Recognition, Washington, 1920, exhibit R, pp 134,135).
De Valera also expressed criticism of “Britain’s manifest usurpation and cruel tyranny in Ireland”, before signing himself, President of the Elected Government of the Republic of Ireland. As a publicity exercise, de Valera’s appeal had a significant impact; as a political measure it had little or no effect.
Once Sir Auckland Geddes was established in Office, he was challenged by American politicians concerning English policy in Ireland. In early May he received a written complaint from eighty-eight members of the House of Representatives, protesting against the system of imprisonment without trial that was in use in Ireland. However, far from being intimidated, Geddes suggested on 5th May 1920 that Lloyd George, himself, should reply: and use the protest as an “opportunity of securing unrivalled publicity for the British point of view” (Geddes to F.O., 5 May 1920, FO 371/4550, PROE; Carroll, American Opinion, p154. The letter of protest was the culmination of Congressman William Mason’s efforts to promote a resolution for the Irish to have “a government of their own choice”). Shrewdly, and significantly, Lloyd George informed Geddes that he did not propose to avail of the opportunity for publicity (FO to Geddes, 20 May 1920, ibid).
Apart from the general thrust of publicity hostile to British policy in Ireland, Lloyd George may well have been aware that Ernest Boyd, a former British consular official, had recently published in America an article that exposed certain features of English rule in Ireland. The article appeared in The Evening Sun of Baltimore, and its very title, ‘The Anarchism of Dublin Castle”, did not suggest an ideal starting point for positive British publicity (Ernest A. Boyd, The Anarchism of Dublin Castle, FO 371/4550, PROE). The contents, which made much of the murder of Thomas MacCurtain, served rather to confirm the views of the protesting members of the House of Representatives than to offer an opportunity for a rebuttal of their charges.
Despite the difficulties bedevilling the campaign in America, Harry Boland was confident of success as he left America for Ireland on 15th May 1920. He was also extremely realistic: he accepted that Irish-Americans did not, and could not, have the same perspective as native Irish people; and was convinced that the struggle against English rule must be fought and won in Ireland. As he put behind him the comforts of the Waldorf Astoria and set sail for, what he termed, ‘Holy Ireland’, Boland confided to his diary—
“Feel very confident and happy, throw off my Waldorf airs and clothes and get back to mother nature and hard manual toil. Look back at New York and contemplate the forces there that are interested and working in Ireland’s cause. I feel more and more convinced that Irishmen in Ireland must themselves win this fight, as the leaders in America have not and in the very nature of things cannot have the same viewpoint and spirit of the men at home” (Boland Diary, 15 May 1920, de Valera Papers, 2172/1, UCDA)
To be continued
