“Why a Club of six is both Europe’s  best hope and its greatest risk” was the title of an article in Social Europe, the  Social Democratic pro-EU Think Tank:  its content should be required reading for all concerned with the Irish Presidency of the EU  later this year.  It outlines the central problem in the EU, which it calls  “The deadlock in the EU-27” and that should be the main item on the coming Irish Presidency’s agenda.

The author, Guillaume Duval, outlines many examples of where the deadlock is occurring and he sees no realistic way of solving it:  because of  the inherent structure of the EU.  He  explains that the structure of the Council and of the Commission was designed for the original six, while the current position is that there are 27 Member States—a position with which that structure cannot cope:  essentially because of the varying size and conflicting interests of all these Members and the fact that, at the same time, they all have equal political status and rights within EU governance. 

The  new Club of Six refers to the German suggestion of a six state grouping of France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Poland, and the Netherlands.  Ireland was not included, and Taoiseach Micheál Martin treated the proposal as being of no significance and seemed, or rather pretended to be,  unconcerned  about the meeting and of being left out of it.  

However the proposal is the latest  example of the basic problem within the EU—all members do not “sing from the same hymn sheet”  on more  and more issues.  This problem should be the primary item on the agenda which Martin will be in charge of later this year when he takes up his position as rotating President of the EU. The Taoiseach cannot close his eyes to what is clearly the main problem—should there be a two tier Europe:  or indeed a three tier EU?

As the Guillaume Duval puts it:

“There is, unfortunately, little doubt about the limitations—and even the paralysis—of the EU-27.  The Union is clearly incapable of making decisions quickly and forcefully enough to defend European interests and values.” 

The  EU  has one legitimate agreed competence:  and that is on Trade:  it has no other competence!

This means it cannot make changes on taxation, foreign and security policy, the budget, revision of the Treaties by majority vote!

Any change to its running requires unanimity.  

This means that when the EU broaches these non-competence issues, there is a governance problem—who or what decides what can be done? 

Duval gives a very good, down-to-earth, illustration of how serious poletical discussion and  decision-making  is hampered by the existing structure of the Council and Commission: 

“…the Council can no longer truly serve as a forum for debate:  once each representative has spoken for five minutes on a subject, two hours and 15 minutes have passed.  As for the Commission, the subdivision of its areas of responsibility into 27 portfolios means there is considerable overlap and that no Commissioner can take significant action across the various domains of EU policy.  Ultimately, only the Presidency of the Commission counts, but this excessive concentration of power slows down and paralyses the work of the institution.” 

He points out that this proposed grouping  of six: 

“together represent only 22 per cent of the EU’s member states, but they account for 70 per cent of its population and 72 per cent of its GDP.  They therefore form a critical mass which, if it moves together, should be able to bring the rest of the EU along with it.” 

In practice this can easily become a euphemism for bullying  and unequal treatment of the rest and no amount of creative manipulation of the rules, regulations, voting systems and overreach can hide that fact.

Duval  gives the example on taxation which is relevant  to Ireland:  

“When a small country reduces taxation on the income and wealth of the very rich and on corporate profits, it certainly loses domestic tax revenue, but this loss can be fairly easily offset by the arrival of additional wealthy individuals and businesses.  When a large country is forced to follow suit—to prevent its wealthy individuals and companies from relocating to these tax havens—it inevitably loses out in terms of tax revenue. Its deficits and public debt increase accordingly.”

The smaller countries which can benefit from this taxation approach happen to have the political muscle to defend themselves against the larger countries through having political equality with the larger states, and the consequent need for unanimity in this area. 

The same problems arises in other areas, as shown by divisions over Ukraine, Mercusor, etc

But it could get much more serious.  Member States are in an arms race with their plans for war on Russia.  Merz plans to have the German Army  become the largest in Europe.  Not to be outdone, Macron plans to have his Force de Frappe  as the European nuclear deterrent:  with France in charge!  He has another grouping of 7 to assist him in this:  Germany, Poland, Belgium, the Netherlands, Greece, Denmark and Sweden.  The French President hopes they will  accept nuclear weapons permanently or temporarily on their territories. 

 Denis Staunton of the Irish Times posed the pertinent question: 

“The first issue about a European nuclear deterrent is that of who should make the decision to deploy a nuclear weapon, raising questions about European governance—qualified majority voting or unanimity, European Council or Commission – but touches on deeper issues of sovereignty and identity.” ( 26.2.26)

He  could hardly have posed a more significant issue in  highlighting the need for the EU to sort itself out as soon as  possible.  After all, the stakes could not get higher if the EU continues on its war-mongering mission, while retaining its ramshackle governance methods.  Another agenda item that Micheál might consider for his Presidency!

But, as the governance issue problem is inherent in the very nature of the EU, it raises the question of how and why the EU got into  this position in the first place! This takes us back to  basics—what is, and why is, there an EU?  

Nowadays, the EU is nearly always treated  as being  synonymous with Europe.  But Europe was there long before the EU.  The EU was created on the ruins of the Europe that once existed.  It did not grow organically from that Europe, in the way that a nation-state is united and formed. 

The EU is a new plant that grew from the embers of the  Europe that destroyed itself in the two World Wars launched by  Britain:  WWI exhausted the France, Germany and Austria;  and the European States went on to destroy themselves in making war on Russia: it was a blank sheet after losing that War.  

The EU planned to commission a history of itself a few years ago, but that was abandoned as being impossible.  It would have meaning facing the truth and the reality of what it had done to itself  in the 20th century.  

It was an ominous portent that the EU found itself unable to account for its own existence. 

Its offspring, the USA, had a definite purpose for Europe after WWII—which it did not have for itself:  apart from continuing conflict within itself.  For example, France sought the pastoralisation and break-up of Germany—they had also wanted  after WWI. 

The US  gave the former combatants a common purpose of being an ally that would assist it in establishing its hegemony of the Western world against Russia.  It saw Europe as being useful ally, if it acted together and became a united entity—following the American pattern— by becoming  the United States of Europe.  This was self-evident to the USA.

But, in contrast to the USA, the European states were not created by lines in a map.  The would-be European union consisted of nations which were long established and with  a history of non-stop rivalry and conflict between them.  Each had its own Demos.  The USA had one Demos:  the settlers—who had to become American for geo-political reasons. 

By contrast, a United States of Europe was  an abstraction.  Structures were created to give substance to this abstraction.  But the abstraction has become realty—but only in the minds of those promoting it today.  They attempt to give it cohesion with another abstraction at its core—the  equality of its member-states—and who can possibly object to equality?  

But  they have  run into the perennial problem of trying to cope with the reality of substantial national differences in size, weight, ideology, and wealth—which cannot be mediated simply by the abstraction of the equality of members,  when trying to make such a relationship  functional.   

In other words, how can the  “deeper issues of sovereignty and identity” that Denis Staunton mentions be resolved:  are the states to be equalised or the problems ignored?   Neither is  feasible.

How is this  to be overcome?  One way is the creation of a European Demos:  but that shows no prospect of happening.  In fact the tendency is clearly in the opposite direction!  

There is no prospect, within the reality of 27 hitherto warring nations,  becoming one political entity because their historic conflicts with each other has defined them.  Conflict is their defining, default, position. 

Another solution is to accept the reality that what exists is an alliance of different and differing states, and for these to make arrangements as they see fit,  to cooperate amongst themselves.  In other words, inter-Governmental level arrangements. 

This is what is happening in reality, but it is obscured and hindered by the existing structure and ideology.   

However, there is one other way of making a cohesive entity out of the European nations, the most serious issue that any state  or states could contemplate—war against an external foe!

That this has been realised in Europe is shown by the mounting pressure to go to War (the war of choice being stoked by Starmer’s Labour Government.   This is the basis of the so called Coalition of the Willing—the EU members  of which are indifferent to being EU members:  the desired War with Russia overrides all other considerations!

Can a European Demos be created on this basis?  If it won such a War, it might be:  but, if is lost, Europe would find itself in even an worse situation than it was after its two  earlier wars  (1914-18, 1939-45).  Europe would revert  to being just a geographical expression. 

Russia has never attacked a European power—but European Powers have attacked Russia down the centuries:    singly and together and were defeated every time.  In the process Europe destroyed itself.  And they now want a re-run! 

Russia must be perplexed about Europe.  It must seem like “a riddle in a mystery wrapped inside an enigma”,  to coin a phrase.

As  Duval concludes:

“If the aim is no longer to operate within the framework of EU institutions but to build a new institutional framework outside the EU—with, for example, a specific treaty on European defence —difficulties are bound to arise quickly between this club of six and the 27-member Union.  Such a vanguard could potentially accelerate the crisis and possibly bring about the end of the EU altogether.”

Micheál  has an opportunity to make history by using his Presidency to help bring the EU to its senses.  Or he can add another nail to its coffin by ignoring these governance  problems. 

But I am certain he  will never allow himself to see any coffin or nails!   When it comes to the EU, this astute politician finds it so much easier and pleasing to endlessly mouth platitudes very, very earnestly as occasion demands!  

This approach may get him through his Presidency but it will not suffice for the future of the European Union.

Jack Lane

PS

By the way, it would be appropriate for the Irish Presidency to  encourage the EU community to take  the opportunity “to think outside the box”, and remind all concerned that they should acknowledge the role of two Irishmen on the history of  Europe.  It would put their endeavours in perspective.  

The very concept of a Europe  was  first envisaged by Columbanus in the seventh century.  It was based  on what he saw being created by him and others from Iona to Rome—with  its Demos of Christianity.  Because of this, Robert Schuman and others proposed that Columbanus be made the Patron Saint of Europe. 

That European Demos lasted until the Reformation, and it was replaced by national Demos.  

Another Irishman, Roger Casement, was a harbinger of  the destruction of that later Europe, when Britian launched the first World War in 1914 —which Casement so succinctly and accurately described as “The Crime against Europe”:  and the destruction was completed by the second war Britain and its Empire launched in 1939.

Between them, Columbanus and Casement book-end the story of Europe:   as they heralded both its beginning and its end!

Jack Lane