Letter to the Editor
From Eamon Dyas
Redefining tariffs as a security tool rather than an instrument of commercial relations has been a ploy of the EU Commission since last December (see link below).
Ostensibly this new policy was a response to the recent actions of Russia in Ukraine but arguably the Commission had been interpreting its commercial powers in an increasingly political way in the context of Europe’s growing use of cheap Russian energy since the early 2000s. And then, as was the case in December 2025, Russia’s relationship with Ukraine was the pretext with Ukraine as the victim and Russia as the culprit.
In 2006 and again in 2009 Russia had occasion to temporarily stop its supply of gas to Ukraine after Kiev refused to pay for gas supplied. On both occasions, within a short time, the supply of gas was resumed after new agreements between Russia and Ukraine. These agreements continued to be favourable to Ukraine in terms of unprecedented preferential supply rates and increased transit charges that Ukraine demanded from Russia for gas traversing Ukraine to Russia’s European customers. At no point was there any serious disruption to the supply of Russian gas to Europe and on both occasions Russia’s behaviour was based on normal commercial practices rather than political considerations.
That however was not the case when it came to the EU Commission’s response to these events. On both occasions the EU insisted in absolving Ukraine of any culpability and depicting Russia’s actions as something other than a legitimate commercial response to a non-paying and contract-breaking customer. That perspective continued to be the basis of the Commission’s policy towards Europe’s energy relationship with Russia ever since and provided a component of how Russia has been viewed as a security threat even prior to the events of 2014.