The Brian P. Murphy OSB Archive. (Series 9)

The Evolution Of British Policy And The Emergence Of A Sinn Fein Publicity Department

In The Years After The Easter Rising, 1916-1918.

Mss notes, Part 22

British Policy On Ulster And The Police, January-February 1920 

From the British point of view there was also a continuity of policy.  Lloyd George and his Government were still deeply engaged in world affairs:  with the result that Ireland was not the major, or only, item on the Cabinet Agenda.  On 10th January 1920 Lloyd George, Bonar Law, and Lord Birkenhead attended the formal ratification of the Versailles Peace Treaty in Paris and the new Imperial demands required constant attention.  The appointment of Sir John Maxwell, the villain—in Irish eyes—of the Easter Rising, to act as a member of Lord Milner’s Commission in Egypt served as a reminder that England’s Imperial soldiers were not concerned with Ireland alone.  ?? Gen. Wilson 

Walter Long still remained the most influential political voice on Irish affairs, and it was the Home Rule Bill that he had shaped so significantly which Macpherson attempted to guide through the House of Commons.  Long was also at one with Lord French (possibly French’s various Memoranda may have influenced him) in dismissing the significance of Dail Eireann and in recommending the firmest of measures against the IRA.  Long informed French at the end of December:

“These vile criminals must be exterminated… you will have the cordial support of the Government… in any steps you may think it necessary to take in order to put an end to their campaign of crime and outrage” (Kendle, Long, p185;  Long to French, 26 Dec. 1919, copy, LP, BL, Add. Ms 62424).

Although Long gradually succumbed to illness in 1920, he did manage a visit to Ireland in January, staying for a while in both Dublin and Belfast.  Originally Long had hoped to preserve the Union, his highest political ideal, by creating a federal solution to the Irish question, in which a nine county Ulster would play a part. (?Jackson and LGs advisers).  Once in Belfast, it became evident to Long that it was the boundaries of any new ‘Ulster’, rather than any abstract consideration of federalism, that occupied Unionist minds.  He reported that—

“people in the inner circles hold the view that the new province should consist of the six counties, the idea being that the inclusion of Donegal, Cavan and Monaghan would provide such an access of strength to the Roman Catholic Party, that the supremacy of the Unionists would be seriously threatened” (Kendle, Long, p186; W. Long, Report On Visit To Ireland, Jan. 1920, LGP, HLRO, F/34/1/6).

However, it was the voices of Bonar Law, Balfour, and Chamberlain at the Cabinet table, especially in the Cabinet meeting of 24th February, that finally tipped the balance in favour of a six county ‘Ulster’.  It was this proposal that formed an integral part of the new Government of Ireland Bill which received its first reading in the House of Commons on 25th February and was to receive its second reading at the end of March.?? (cf Jackson).  

The proposals of Long, however much they ignored the aspirations of Sinn Fein as expressed by Dail Eireann, did provide a clear political focus for British policy in Ireland.  There remained, however, a lack of any purposeful plan for the day to day management of Irish affairs.  Coercion had been the order of the day in 1919 and, writing from the Vice-Regal lodge in Dublin on 3rd January 1920, Lord French made it clear that he was to begin the year as he had ended the last.  

Possibly it was understandable, in the light of the recent attempt on his life, that Lord French expressed a jaundiced view of the entire police force, declaring it to be “absolutely inefficient”.  He added that the secret service was “simply non-existent”, and that the—

“DMP are absolutely demoralised, and the RIC will be in the same case very soon if we do not quickly set our house in order” (Ibid).   

French had taken initial steps to put his house in order in 1919 by appointing William Redmond as a Second Assistant Commissioner of the DMP.  His brief was not only to assist Colonel Edgeworth Johnstone and the detective division of the DMP, but also to liaise with the crimes Special Branch of the RIC (Richard Abbot, Police Casualties In Ireland, 1919-1923, Cork and Dublin, 2000, pp52,55;  Evening Telegraph, 22 Jan. 1920; ?? look back for mention of Redmond).  

It was to Redmond that French looked for an answer to the warning of Basil Thomson, made on ? Dec. 1919, that Collins was the main threat to the police service.  The formal announcement of the dismissal of General Byrne of the RIC on 6th January 1920 was intended as a further step towards the transformation of the police force.  

Smith?? title replaced Byrne as head of the RIC, although it was not until March [1920] that the legal requirements surrounding his dismissal were finalised (cf. O’Halpin;  Fisher for details re. March and end p918 ;  dates from Ev. Tel.  Byrne rest on 11th Dec., and 10th March termination ??appt. of Smith). 

The emergence of Redmond and Smith, both with origins in Belfast, as leading figures in the DMP and RIC marked a significant shift in the character of the police forces. 

The Irish Bulletin immediately used extracts from the world and national press to portray the dismissal of Byrne as confirmation of the militarisation of the police force.  General Byrne, it was maintained, was dismissed because of his endeavours to maintain the distinction between the civil and military roles of the force.  A report from the Daily News of 10th January was cited to indicate that—

“plans appear to have been laid for employing the police openly as a branch of the army service…  the RIC would in short be at the disposal of the military…”  (?? ref.).

This plan was substantiated by a report in the Daily Telegraph that, since General Byrne was asked to take leave on 11th December—

“there has been brisk recruiting—far better than for many months—a large number of ex-sailors and soldiers are now in training at headquarters for the force”  (Ev. Tel. 14 Jan. 1920, citing Daily Telegraph) .

 The Evening Telegraph of 13th January 1920 even carried a photograph of a recruit enlisting in London:  one of the men who was to form the unit that became known as the Black and Tans  (Ev. Tel. 13 Jan. 1920).

The political and religious ramifications of the dismissal of General Byrne were also spelt out by the Irish Bulletin and the Evening Telegraph. (nb: reminder linked with FJ [Freeman’s Journal ?]:  General Byrne, it was pointed out, was known as “the last of the Asquithians”:  and his departure signified the triumph in Dublin Castle of political forces that were more conservative and more sympathetic to Unionism than those of the Asquith period (Ev. Tel. 9 Jan. 1920, citing the Daily Express).  

The religious factor in Byrne’s dismissal was also stressed—rightly, it would appear, in the light of Lord French’s private observations on the loyalty of Catholics.  The Evening Telegraph stated that Byrne was “the only Catholic that ever filled the office”, and added that—

“the Inspector-Generalship of the RIC was previously known to be closed to Catholics by tradition, practice, and the determination of the Orange Ascendancy.”  

The Ascendancy Party, the paper concluded—

“have now come fully into their own again, and we are not in the least surprised that he has got short shrift, notwithstanding his record” (Ev. Tel. 9 Jan. 1920).

(appt. of Smith of Belfast) 

This analysis of the dismissal of General Byrne, and the character of the Dublin Castle administration at the time, may be dismissed as mere propaganda on the part of Sinn Fein but, in fact, it was corroborated by a most unlikely source, Sir Warren Fisher, the head of the British Civil Service.  

Having investigated the circumstances surrounding the termination of General Byrne’s appointment in a later review of the incident, Fisher stated that—

“in the course of 1919 Lord French, Mr. Macpherson, Sir John Taylor, Mr. E. Saunderson (secretary to the lord lieutenant), and Mr. Watt (secretary to the chief secretary) had convinced themselves that the only cure for the (then) sporadic and infrequent exhibitions of force in Ireland was the total excommunication of Sinn Fein as such with bell, book and candle.  

“The fact that Sinn Fein was a political creed… escaped the notice of these gentlemen.  They merely regarded it as a convertible term with the physical force faction which at that time—as shown by results—was quite a trifling element.  

“So, drawing no distinction between the gunmen of that date and Sinn Fein as a whole, they decided that the Irish problem would be solved if the majority of the people in Ireland were forbidden to think, discuss, talk, write or speak the political views which they favoured…”  (Fisher to Chamberlain and Lloyd George, 18 Nov. 1921, Chamberlain Papers, AC 23/2/16 in Eunan O’Halpin, Sir Warren Fisher And The Coalition, 1919-1922, 24, 4 (1981), p918) 

This analysis of the policy emanating from Dublin Castle and of those identified with it, even extending to a recognition of the part in it of Saunderson and Watt, was in accord with the views propounded by the Irish Bulletin and by Childers during the past year.  So also was the opinion of Fisher that Sinn Fein should be recognised as “a political creed”, rather than as an organisation to be proscribed.  ?? similar to Cooper  

It was in this context, Fisher maintained, that General Byrne had been unfairly judged:

“In high places in Ireland there were some —not many—of whom Sir Joseph Byrne was one, who realised the full implication of ‘proclaiming’, that is proscribing in it its entirety, a political creed.  No attention was paid to their warnings that such a procedure would reinforce indefinitely the physical force party, and would justify their methods in the eyes of the population as being the only instrument left to them.”

It was for this reason, Fisher concluded, that Byrne was dismissed.  He was deemed “to have lost his nerve and to be in sympathy with the ‘rebels’, by which was meant Sinn Fein” (Ibid).

Fisher was to intervene directly and decisively in the conduct of the Irish administration in May 1920 but, in January 1920, Lord French continued to implement a policy that was based on proscription and coercion.  

The further comments of Lord French to Londonderry on 3rd January served to confirm the nationalist view that the Ascendancy had regained control of the Irish administration.  His letter implied that, in the absence of Macpherson, French, himself, remained the dominant influence in Irish affairs.  Sir John Taylor, whom French described as “perfectly splendid”, became even more powerful in the administration of Dublin Castle (French to Londonderry, 3 Jan. 1920, French Papers, 75/46/12, IWM;  cf retirement letters for 9 Jan. and new powers to Taylor).  French also repeated his opinion that James MacMahon could not be trusted at the Castle because of his “violently Catholic tendencies” (ibid).  The primacy of Taylor over MacMahon ensured that the regulations of DORA [Defence Of The Realm Act] and the Jubilee Coercion Act would continue to dictate Dublin Castle’s response to the affairs of Ireland.   

The supremacy of Taylor also ensured that Alan Bell would still enjoy a major part in the implementation of these legal constraints and that his personal battle with Michael Collins for control of the Dail Eireann Bond money would continue.  As if to prove the point, three buildings associated with the Loan were ordered to close at the beginning of January.  When this Order was disregarded, the buildings were raided by the police and military on 7th January 1920.  The New Ireland Assurance Society on Bachelor’s Walk was forcibly entered by the army;  the Sinn Fein Bank at 6 Harcourt Street was occupied by a group of military and police;  and the same combination of forces entered the Dail Eireann offices at 76 Harcourt Street.  Most of the doors of the buildings were barricaded with planks and nailed up by the police as they left (Evening Telegraph, 8 Jan. 1920, cf. original Clarke file).  

The Irish Bulletin and other journals attempted to highlight the manner in which the democratic efforts of Dail Eireann were opposed by the police and military.  

Brian Murphy

(To be continued.)