Eamon Dyas
The question is, how have we reached the point where the European Commission has assumed that it has the authority to formulate Europe’s foreign policy?
This situation has evolved from the way in which Russia’s military operation in Ukraine has been framed as a threat to Europe. It is on the back of that assumed threat that the Commission has begun to behave as if it has the power to formulate foreign policy and apply it in what are the most significant and sensitive circumstances confronting Europe since the Second World War.
This is the case, despite issues of security per se not being within the competence of the Commission. Primary responsibility for security remains within the competence of the individual member states. However, the Commission has incrementally assumed power over certain aspects of European security when it comes to certain areas of the internal security of the EU. The most significant area where, in the past, it succeeded in that regard was the way it which it sidelined member states in the area of energy policy through defining cheap Russian energy as a security threat.
The conflict in Ukraine has offered the Commission a similar opportunity to expand this power as its influence over energy policy has enabled it to blend that authority with the interpretation and expansion of anti-Russian sanctions. On top of that, all the evidence-free incidents of Russian “sabotage” and “drone incursions” in Europe can be subsumed into the area on internal security where the Commission feels it has a legitimate voice to comment upon. Then there is the current move to synchronise European transport infrastructure with the anticipated needs of NATO in a future war with Russia as well as the arrangements for the central funding of Europe’s defence industries all of which offer areas on the borders between trade and security that the Commission has successfully exploited to advance its de facto incursion into foreign policy formation.
On the top of this, the most recent event appears to show that there has emerged a type of symbolic relationship between the Commission and Europe’s most powerful militaristic states in ways that also perpetuate the idea that the Commission is at the heart of EU foreign policy.
The so-called EU counter-proposals to Washington’s peace plan were in fact drafted by Germany, France and the UK. Though the UK is not even a member of the EU these were presented as EU proposals and Ursula van der Leyen addressed a press conference in South Africa as a representative of those proposals.
The fact that they were proposals that were not endorsed by all EU member states and that they were drafted by a triad of Europe’s most powerful military states – one of which is not even a member of the EU – was over-layered by the press conference statements by the President of the European Commission. In this way the voice of the U.K., alongside that of Germany and France, are given pre-eminence in the formulation of European foreign policy while the Commission is given the opportunity to present itself as the voice of European foreign diplomacy.
Eamon Dyas
21.11.25
From: Eamon Dyas <eamondyas@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: EU Commission’s military mobilisation against Russia
Date: 21 November 2025 at 09:56:12 GMT
To: gwydionwilliams130@gmail.com
Cc: aubaneg@googlegroups.com
Indeed Madawc. But the point isn’t the relative military capabilities of the EU and Russia. Rather the way in which the EU Commission is using the situation to advance its authority over the EU in much the same way it did when it exaggerated the threat from cheap Russian energy in order to advance the idea of energy security as a vehicle for expanding its authority previously.
On Fri, 21 Nov 2025 at 08:52, <gwydionwilliams130@gmail.com> wrote:
If they attacked Russia, Russia could do a lot of things, including limited nuclear strikes on military bases. Without the USA, they are much weaker. So it must be bluster.
From: aubaneg@googlegroups.com <aubaneg@googlegroups.com> On Behalf Of Eamon Dyas
Sent: 21 November 2025 08:24
To: aubaneg@googlegroups.com
Subject: EU Commission’s military mobilisation against Russia
The EU Commission has no legal power to institute a European-wide military mobilisation but this latest move in effect is what it is doing insofar as it can. According to its own statement on “X”
“We are making Europe ready to move where and when it matters most.
“The EU’s Military Mobility Package put forward today ensures troops and equipment can be deployed fast and critical infrastructure stays secure.”
As to “where and when it matters most” it’s obvious that the “where” is Russia and the “when” is the time of its own choosing.
The link below provides details of the Commission’s proposal that is being presented to the Council and European Parliament for approval.
This represents an attempt by the Commission to create a centralised authority capable of mobilising the combined military power of the EU on the back of the current push to expand its military production capabilities. According to the document:
“The measures will create an EU-wide military mobility area where troops, equipment and military assets can move around quickly and smoothly.”
But the Press Release from the Commission provides more details of how this is to be interpreted.
According to this it aims to create
“a new European Military Mobility Enhanced Response System (EMERS) for fast-track procedures and priority access to infrastructure, supporting armed forces acting in the context of EU or NATO.”
In terms of the background to the proposal it states:
“In March 2025, the Commission and the High Representative put forward the White Paper for European Defence – Readiness 2030, complemented by the Commission’s ReArm Europe Plan/Readiness 2030, an ambitious defence package providing financial levers to EU Member States to drive an investment surge in defence capabilities.
“The military mobility package and the EU Defence Industry Transformation Roadmap were both highlighted as key priority areas in the White Paper and in the Defence Readiness Roadmap 2030.
“The military mobility package 2025 also builds on lessons learned from the revised Action Plan 2.0 and the 2024 Military Mobility Pledge. It has been developed in close coordination with the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the European Defence Agency (EDA), ensuring coherence with NATO standards and procedures.”
In other words, the Commission has used the conflict in Ukraine to assume responsibility for overseeing the defence of the EU in ways that militarily harmonise with NATO.
How have we arrived at the point where the Commission has been incrementally expanding its claimed competencies beyond those which used to be restricted to issues of trade and regulation to assuming the role it now claims? This has been done on the back of the artificially generated hysteria surrounding the so-called threat from Russia without any real discussion of the detrimental impact of this on the national sovereignty of member states? And what are the implications of this for those member states like Ireland and Austria that, for the time being at least, continue to adhere to policies of neutrality?
Those who genuinely seek a peaceful future for Europe must begin by clipping the wings of the vulture that has become EU Commission. If this is not done, and done quickly, we will soon end up in a situation where the role of the centralised European military authority that the EU Commission’s proposals are predicated upon will be assumed by the war-hungry elements of the Commission itself.
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Irish Political Review 