The Brian P. Murphy OSB Archive. (Series 9)

The evolution of British policy and the emergence of a Sinn Fein Publicity Department

in the years after the Easter Rising, 1916-1918.

Mss notes, Part 21

English Response:  December 1919 

Remarkably, the reference by Childers to racial superiority was substantiated, even as he wrote, by Lord French, when writing on conditions in Ireland.  In a Memorandum of 17th December 1919, French reported that the Irish people, while quick-witted and impulsive, are “not a deep thinking people” (Memo. by Lord French, 17 Dec. 1919, French Papers 75/46/12, IWM).  The conclusion drawn on the Irish situation, which French submitted to the Cabinet, flew in the face of all available evidence and, in many ways, substantiated Childers’ view of life in Ireland.  

Even allowing for the publicity slant that was associated with the Irish Bulletin and the articles by Childers, the picture of Ireland that French portrayed was nothing short of a chimera.  In French’s opinion Sinn Fein had reached its zenith at the last General Election and “has been for some time and now is definitely on the wane”.  He then affirmed that the real feeling in Ireland was “never in favour of a Republic, or indeed, any form of complete separation”, and asserted that:

“1919 has seen the ruin of Sinn Fein as a clean, sane, and ideal organisation, and has reduced it to the level of a foul murder club.’ (Ibid.)  It was as if the Sinn Fein victory in the general election of 1918 and the setting up of Dail Eireann had never taken place.   

Looking back to meetings with Walter Long and the Chief Secretary in September, French declared that he fully sympathised with the policy recommended by them of crushing the murder campaign by firm measures.  For that reason he supported the banning of Sinn Fein, the taking of a firm line on hunger-strikers and the introduction of three-judge courts.  While reiterating his call for a policy of firmness, French repeated his earlier remarks that Sir Joseph Byrne, Inspector General of the RIC, was ‘quite unfit’ to implement such a policy. (Memo. by French, 17 Dec.1919, French Papers 75/46/12, IWM)   

Two days later, on 19 December 1919, another secret memorandum was submitted to Macpherson by Sir Basil Thomson, the Director of Intelligence, at Scotland House. (nb Thomson memo in 1918)  The memorandum, which claimed to be based on ‘an absolutely trustworthy source,’ made several claims about Michael Collins: firstly, that he was ‘directing the murders of Policemen;’… secondly, ‘that he has attained such a position that his friends say that the Police do not dare to touch him;’… and, thirdly, ‘that if an attempt was made to arrest him it would participate a rising in Ireland.’ (Secret memorandum, 19 Dec. 1919, Strathcarron MS 490, Bodleian) The memorandum also claimed that Michael Collins had a list of the number of British troops in Ireland and of their distribution throughout the country.  

Ironically, on the very day that the memorandum was presented to Macpherson, 19 December 1919, there was an assassination attempt on Lord French’s life.  The attack, which had been approved by Michael Collins, happened in broad daylight near the entrance to the Vice-Regal lodge in the Phoenix Park.  Although French survived, shocked but unscathed, the attack served as a reminder of the ever increasing armed dimension of the conflict and as an indication that French’s confident analysis of the Irish situation could not be relied upon. (?? cf. Hopkinson?? books on French)  The failed assassination attempt also had an impact on French’s private circumstances.  He had been loaned £2,000 pounds by friends in 1914 but, despite the best efforts of Locker Lampson to retrieve his money, French had failed to respond.  On 22 August 1919 he had even informed Henry Gwynne, the editor of the Morning Post, who was acting as mediator in the dispute, that his position as Lord Lieutenant was ‘notoriously underpaid.’ (French to Gwynne, 22 Aug. 1919, Gwynne Papers, 19, Bodleian)  Following the attempt on his life, Lampson humorously asked Gwynne ‘what about sending French a wire for his money?  I am so afraid he will be shot before he pays.’ (Lampson to Gwynne, 31 Dec. 1919, Gwynne Papers, 19, Bodleian)  Jokes apart, however, it was significant that French was beholden to a newspaper editor and dependent on his posting as Lord Lieutenant to pay his way. (Gwynne to French, 30 March 1920, enclosing solicitor’s letter, 19, Gwynne Papers, Bodleian.  The money had not been returned at that stage)     

However, the assassination attempt did nothing to change the policy of Lloyd George’s government.  As the year ended Walter Long continued to refine the Home Rule Act without having any regard to the views of the majority of Ireland’s elected representatives, while in Ireland Lord French, Sir John Taylor and Alan Bell continued to implement a policy of firmness that relied heavily on the support of the military rule provided by the Competent Military Authority. 

Sinn Fein in America, November-December 1919 

In America, while the differences between the Devoy and de Valera camps were moving ineluctably towards the creation of two separate organisations, there was unity of accord in opposing the acceptance of the terms of the Peace Treaty.  Article X of the League of Nations, which recognised the existing territorial boundaries of states, thus placing Ireland within the British Empire, was a special target of Irish-Americans.  (nb see earlier for dev always doubtful of League) When it was rejected on 19 November 1919, Harry Boland noted in his diary: ‘Treaty dead.  Great news for Ireland.  England has now to reckon with a unified Race.  We can now go ahead with direct Irish appeal for recognition.’ (Boland Diary, 19 Nov. 1919, de Valera Papers, Boland/2172/1)  ?? see Maher and Fitzp) 

By 30 November Harry Boland was in an even more confident mood, writing that ‘this month should see the end of indecision.  I have hopes that Bond Drive shall be accomplished in time.  O’Mara in command guarantees success.’  He then noted that Sean Nunan had been assigned to O’Mara as his secretary and that he, himself, had resumed his position as secretary of de Valera.  He recorded that de Valera was ‘in great form bursting with energy and determined to carry out Loan cum weal or woe.’  Clearly in high spirits Boland concluded his note for the day with the exclamation, ‘Up de Valera.'(Boland Diary, 30 Nov. 1919, de Valera Papers, Boland/2172/1)   

Harry Boland had reason to be content in regard to the Bonds but he was silent in his diary about another potential cause of discord: the relationship between the two revolutionary bodies, Clan na Gael in America and the IRB in Ireland.  Silence on the matter also concealed another dimension to the War of Independence: the role of Michael Collins as President of the IRB and the leading organiser of the importation of arms into Ireland.  Collins wrote to Boland on 23 November concerning the securing of arms and, at about the same time, issued a statement praising John Devoy and the work of the Clan. (Collins to Boland, 23 Nov. 1919, Mulcahy Papers P7a/209 p. 93, UCDA)   

For the moment his statement eased the tensions that had been created by Boland’s request for help in regard to arms and money from the Clan and postponed an answer to Boland’s question as to whether the Clan ‘regards itself as a subsidiary body to the home organisation or an independent body.’ (Sean O Murthuile memoir, ?Mulcahy Papers P7a/209 p.94, UCDA)  This ultimate question, however, concerning the relationship between the two revolutionary organisations, the Clan na Gael and the IRB, as with the question of the unity of the political organisations, was merely post postponed.  Both questions were to surface in the coming year and demanded a resolution.   

However, as the year ended Harry Boland was full of confidence.  He recorded on 30 December 1919 that de Valera was ‘very pleased’ with the new headquarters of the Bond Drive in Washington, which had been established by James O’Mara. (Boland Diary, 30 Dec. 1919, de Valera Papers/ Boland/2172/1)  A meeting, on the same day, with George Creel, who introduced him to Joseph Tumulty, President Wilsons’ secretary, indicated that the mission was making influential contacts.  Lloyd George, in a private letter of the same day, 30 December, was informed that ‘the feeling in America is in favour of Ireland;’ ‘de Valera is having a good reception.’ (George Barnes to Lloyd George, 30 Dec. 1919, LG Papers, F4/3/30, House of Lords)  It would appear, therefore, that Harry Boland had good reason to conclude his diary on 31 December with the opinion that ‘the year has been one of great adventure?? for me and has given me 365 days of real happiness??.  I feel that Ireland’s cause has made wonderful progress and hope the year we are entering in will see the triumph of Ireland.’ (Boland Diary, 31 Dec. 1919, de Valera Papers/Boland/2172/1) 

End 1920 

(nb letter in April 1920 in Strathcarron after resignation of Macpherson) cf. also IB?? re raid on MC. 

Assnt attempt on French 19 Dec. cf Hopkinson and Police book plus somewhere DOD on Finance. NB This list and visits to Ireland by FE linked with Long Committee on Ireland cf. FJ and later list at end of Dec. 1919 cf. Bulletin end Jan. for facts and 24 Feb.’20 for Taylor cf. also O’Broin, Bennett and Norway plus Duggan. cf. Illustrated London News notes 

Memo of French 17 Dec. 1919  ?? FJ and Kendle re Long visits to I. 

?? more at end of 1920? 

From Barton 5638 p. 16 of notes – a ballad. 

The Bould Black and Tan (air of Master McGrath) 

‘Said Lloyd George to Macpherson I give you the sack 

To uphold law and order you haven’t the knack. 

I’ll send over Greenwood a much stronger man 

And fill the Green Isle with the bould Black and Tan.’  

NB EC leaving London end Dec. cf. Diary and Ring p.216 

NB Move in chron. order *  On the nomination of Michael Collins, Childers was appointed one of the five original Directors of the National Land Bank in January 1920. ?? Barton here? He was also appointed Chairman of the Republican Justices of Rathmines and Pembroke. (Erskine Childers, The Arrest and Trial of  

Captain Childers, p. 6, Dublin, 1922?) 

Propaganda – 1920 

Evolution of the Irish Bulletin 

The Sinn Fein publicity campaign in 1920 was conducted along the lines that had proved successful in the previous year: advocacy of the democratic credentials of Dail Eireann and an appeal for Ireland’s claim for recognition as a sovereign country were complemented by an expose of the military character of British rule in Ireland.  Such was the message that the Irish Bulletin, under the direction of Robert Brennan and Frank Gallagher, continued to spell out and they did so in extremely demanding circumstances.  ‘There was nothing the British sought more vigorously,’ Gallagher wrote, ‘than the offices and staff of The Irish Bulletin.  They raided hundreds of houses in search of it.  They held up great blocks of the capital, and for days and nights went from room to room.  They had touts and G-men watching every likely building, and half-a-dozen agents dropping in casually to this or that shop or store or office on the chance of lighting on it.’ (David Hogan, The Four Glorious Years, Dublin, 1983, p.83; G men i.e. detectives from the DMP) 

According to Kathleen McKenna the quest for safe offices and the concern for personal safety dominated almost every thinking moment of those who worked for the Bulletin and, in these circumstances, it was forced to move its location on several occasions.  The first enforced move had taken place in mid-December 1919 after a police raid on 6 Harcourt Street in which indexed press clipping compiled by Brennan and Gallagher were removed. (Brennan, Allegiance, p. 263)  Offices were then set up at 22 Upper Mount Street, the home of the Nugent family.(Napoli, CA p. 84??)  Following a military raid on many houses with a two in their number, Brennan instructed Michael Noyk to rent an office at 11 Molesworth Street – an ideal address in the centre of Dublin. (Brennan, Allegiance, p. 265 ?? see Noyk statement) 

In the words of Frank Gallagher it was ‘a thoroughly good old Unionist street, with the Masonic Lodge at one end and an Episcopalian Hall at the other.  In between were staid offices of family solicitors.’ The building chosen for the Bulletin offices also housed the rooms of the Crown Solicitor, and ‘The Church of Ireland’s Widows’ and Orphans’ Society.’ (David Hogan, Four Glorious Years, p.118 and p.84; Brennan pp 265,266 for surprise visit by Denis Henry.  In fact Henry was Attorney-General for Ireland; Sir Henry Wynne was the Chief Crown Solicitor)  The premises could hardly have been more respectable and they provided an excellent address for the Insurance Society behind whose doors the Irish Bulletin operated.  ?? cf. Brennan pp 297,298 for next office in 1921 and new staff – James Carty.?? nb check date for Molesworth Street)  

From behind the doors of the Molesworth Street address the Irish Bulletin, in the words of Gallagher, ‘became the most effective of all weapons against Britain.’  ‘Day after day,’ Gallagher continued, ‘it set out, not in argument, but in cold, hard fact, the reality of the horrors of British rule in Ireland … for every charge made against the British in the Bulletin, there was day and date and place … soon it was appreciated that this was a new form of war propaganda – one based on actual happenings, observed and provable.’ (Hogan, Four, pp 86,87 nb uses figure for circulation at end)  Like La Libre Belgique, the underground paper produced in Belgium during the German occupation, the Irish Bulletin attempted to provide a voice for the Irish people in the face of some danger.  That was the way that Frank Gallagher saw the situation in 1920. (Hogan, p.83)   

Writing to his fiancée on 20 January 1920 he recounted a chat with Desmond FitzGerald over the fire in the office during which it emerged that ‘we were agreed that failure in our time was almost certain but that failure seeming to be our duty needs but that it be honourable failure.’ (Gallagher to Cecilia, 20 Jan. 1920, Gallagher Papers, 10050/92, Trinity Ms)  A few days later he was less fearful of imminent tragedy but was still convinced that, despite the vacillation in policy emanating from Dublin Castle, ‘the time is not long delayed for some action.’ (Ibid.)  Life was not all gloom and doom, however.  In the same letter Gallagher recalled a pleasant evening at the home of Erskine Childers and a happy encounter with his wife, an invalid, but ‘quite beautiful’ with ‘a sense of humour.’ (Ibid.) 

Childers, himself, dedicated almost all of his time, at the start of the year, to the National Land Bank.  His diary for the month of January records regular meetings of the Bank Directors; private meetings with Lionel Smith Gordon and with Robert Barton about the bank; and visits to the Land Commission. (Childers Diary, Jan. 1920, 7811, Trinity MS)  He was also chairman of the Republican Justices of Rathmines and Pembroke.  The first meeting of directors took place on 7 January 1920 at the Bank’s headquarters at 5 Harcourt Terrace.  On 21 January Childers seconded a motion by which the registered address was changed to 68 Lower Leeson Street and on 28 January the directors resolved that they, and the staff, would take lessons in Irish. (Peggy Quinn, An Irish Banking Revolution, Dublin, 1995, pp 12-14.  Lionel Smith Gordon’s name became for a time L. Gardunach MacGahain)  From that time onwards Childers began to take Irish classes.   

At the end of the month Childers participated in a correspondence in The Irish Statesman on the Strategic Unity of Ireland. Nb explain Statesman and Plunkett link  ‘The spectacle of Irishmen,’ he wrote, ‘engaged in a solemn technical discussion as to whether or not their country is strategically necessary to England strikes me as grotesquely futile.  As well might lambs in the innermost recesses of a boa-constrictor debate as to their own digestibility?’ (The Irish Statesman, 31 Jan. 1920)  The satirical fable, an unusual form of expression for Childers, ended with one of the lambs suggesting that ‘instead of wasting strength in arid academics, we endeavour to fight our way out … It would be less Utopian in my opinion to try and persuade this monster that the methods he employs in his civilising mission should be abandoned on moral grounds, rather than that in our particular case he is making an error of tactics, or peptics if you will.’ (ibid.)  Using the irony of the fable and the levity of language, Childers conveyed the strong message that Ireland would do better to fight her way out of the British Empire than to negotiate the terms of her place within it. 

The Irish Bulletin regularly reported on the work of Barton, Childers and their other Protestant colleagues to show that many diverse interests were contributing to the work of Dail Eireann.  On 21 January 1920 the Bulletin carried an item on ‘Industrial Suppression in Ireland,’ which related how armed police had raided a meeting in Cork of the Irish Industrial Commission and broken it up.  Among those attending were Sir Henry Grattan-Bellew and Lionel Smith Gordon, directors of the Bank, and other experts in their fields such as George Russell, of the Co-operative Society, A. Robb, an Ulster linen manufacturer and Thomas Johnson, treasurer of the Irish Trade Union Congress. (IB, 21 Jan.’20)  A delegation from the British Labour Party witnessed the police action and declared that they could not understand why such action was taken ‘unless it be part of a deliberate policy, calculated to hinder the development of Irish industries.’ (IB 26 Jan.’20)  The Irish Bulletin used the Labour Party statement to sustain its view that, indeed, it was the policy of the British administration to prevent Irish industry benefiting from a united effort which transcended differences of creed and class. 

This routine work of business transactions was shattered on?? 31 January 1920, when Robert Barton and many other Sinn Feiners were arrested and taken to Mountjoy. (see Barton witness statement)  The re-arrest of his cousin caused great personal anxiety to Childers and placed an even greater burden on his shoulders in regard to the Land Bank.  The arrests themselves served as further confirmation that it was Dublin Castle policy to prevent the renewal of Irish industry by Dail Eireann – a policy that had been identified and condemned by Bryan Cooper, the former Press Censor, in the autumn of 1919.  In these circumstances it was understandable that Childers had very little time for propaganda work.   

Meanwhile, one of the many contacts of Childers in England, Charles Diamond, had been arrested.  Diamond, the editor of the Catholic Herald and an experienced journalist, had written on 27 December, in the aftermath of the assassination attempt on Lord French, that ‘killing is no murder when it is the other fellow who is to be killed, but killing is very real murder when we ourselves are in danger.’ (Evening Telegraph, 24 Jan. 1920) Despite Diamond’s plea that, far from inciting murder, he was merely trying to expose the tyranny and brutality of the Dublin Castle regime, he received a six months’ prison sentence. (Boyce, Englishmen pp 77,78 fn ?? G.A. Beck (ed.) The English Catholics, London, 1950, p. 508) nb details given earlier and need to omit in earlier statement.  (To be continued)