The Brian P. Murphy OSB Archive. (Series 9)

The evolution of British policy and the emergence of a Sinn Fein Publicity Department

in the years after the Easter Rising, 1916-1918.

Mss notes, Part 18

Foundation of Irish Bulletin 

Childers was in Dublin for the publication of the first issue of the Irish Bulletin on 11th November 1919.  It was a logical development to the Weekly Summary and was a natural evolution of the policy introduced by Desmond Fitzgerald.  In the view of Kathleen McKenna, a member of the clerical staff, “the Irish Bulletin was the idea of the Director (FitzGerald) and his only” (McKenna Napoli to Editor of Sunday Press, 17 August 1951, in Frank Gallagher Papers, 21220, NLI.  Her letter was a response to an article by Gallagher on the Irish Bulletin, which had omitted any mention of FitzGerald).  However, with Fitzgerald in London, the work on the ground was conducted by Robert Brennan and Frank Gallagher, working in tandem with the able team that had been assembled.  As the journal was located on the second floor of 6 Harcourt Street, the Sinn Fein Headquarters, it was natural that Arthur Griffith—a journalist himself and friend of FitzGerald, as well as being Acting-President of Dail Eireann—should take an active interest in an enterprise that was being conducted in the house where he worked.   

The preparatory work for publication of the Irish Bulletin took place on two fronts:  an office staff was selected to produce the journal;  and contacts were made abroad to facilitate the  circulation of the journal.  The staff assembled by Robert Brennan included Anna FitzSimons, a former Secretary to the novelist George Moore, Kathleen McGilligan, Sheila and Honor Murphy, Michael Nunan, Seamus Hynes and Kathleen McKenna (?? cf Meda and McCoole for more).  McKenna had some practical experience of publishing from her family’s involvement with ‘Sinn Fein—The Oldcastle Monthly Review’, and acted as typist, mimeographer, and distributor of the paper.  Indeed McKenna, a young woman in her early twenties, claimed to have typed and mimeographed every copy of the Irish Bulletin from its inception in 1919 until the Truce of July 1921 (David Hogan, The Four Glorious Years, Dublin, 1953, p119;  Kathleen McKenna, The Irish Bulletin, in Capuchin Annual, 1969?/, pp503-527;  letter of McKenna to Editor of Sunday Press, 17 Aug. 1951 in Frank Gallagher Papers, 21220, NLI; Anna FitzSimmons Kelly, 1 Aug. 1938).

 Even allowing for the fact that McKenna’s published account of her work at the Irish Bulletin may have accorded her rather more prominence than other staff members, her individual role was certainly important and revealing.  She had been appointed by Robert Brennan to work in the Department of Propaganda on 10th October 1919, with the special responsibility of looking after ‘the Macpherson file’.  It was, she stated, “considered a very seditious document” (McKenna Napoli to Gallagher, 21 Oct. 1936, containing copy of her claim to a war pension:  in Frank Gallagher Papers, 18346, NLI).  That such a file existed speaks volumes about the level of research and detailed planning that characterised the Department of Propaganda.   

 McKenna also had the responsibility of taking copies of the Irish Bulletin to various Departments of Dail Eireann and of Sinn Fein.  For her own safety, as she regularly passed through military and police check-points, she was advised by Robert Brennan not to join Cumann na mBann as it might imperil her work.  

On occasions in 1920 she conveyed news to Sean Lester of the Freeman’s Journal and this contact may well have contributed to the evolving character of that paper during the war years (Ibid. Paudeen O’Keeffe’s office over Nugent’s shop in Baggott Street?? cf Lester book).

Regular contact was also maintained with Diarmuid O’Hegarty who had an office above Manfield’s footwear store at the junction of O’Connell and Middle Abbey Streets.  He was Secretary of Dail Eireann, a member of the Irish Republican Brotherhood, and a friend of Michael Collins (cf, DE minutes, 19 June 1919 for position and others).  He also acted as a liaison officer between Dail Eireann and the Propaganda Department.  O’Hegarty provided Brennan with reports from the various Departments of the Dail, and he also gave him information from the Volunteer Headquarters and republican Commandants in the field relating to military engagements, murders and raids.  These sources of news were invaluable to the staff of the Irish Bulletin.  O’Hegarty himself was assisted by a staff comprising Eamon Price, Madge Clifford, Molly Ryan, and Bridie Clune (McKenna, 514 ?? cf. FitzGerald at UCD).

The Irish Bulletin made its first appearance in dramatic circumstances on 11th November [1919].  In Dublin the first anniversary of Armistice Day was marked by clashes between those carrying Union Jacks and those carrying the Irish Tricolour.  Crowds gathered outside the Sinn Fein headquarters, and the process of publishing the Bulletin was carried out to the background singing of ‘Let Me Carry Your Cross for Ireland Lord‘, the final prayer of Thomas Ashe, and ‘The Soldier’s Song’.   

At the same time a raid took place on the headquarters of Dail Eireann at 76 Harcourt Street, which was carried out by four lorries of police and soldiers. ?? check.  This was witnessed by Erskine Childers:

“On November 11 the morning upon which two minutes’ silence had been ordained to commemorate “the divine blessing of peace”, the police and military carried out an armed raid upon the Dail’s offices and arrested every male person upon the premises indiscriminately and without warrant”  (Studies, Dec. 1919, pp 601,602;  Diary 7811, 11 Nov. 1919; photo of incident facing p3 of Childers, Military Rule in Ireland, Dublin, 1920).  

He recorded that three Sinn Fein MPs were among those arrested and all were taken off to gaol in lorries crammed with soldiers in full war kit.  Many papers were also removed.  Childers concluded with the damning verdict that “we must take a wide view of history to find a parallel for this.  Germany has nothing like it to her credit” (Studies, ibid. p602.  NB give Studies as propaganda source).

Despite raids, searches, arrests and imprisonment, Brennan and Gallagher slowly built up the reputation of the Irish Bulletin.  The first issues—and it was published five days a week—only numbered about fifty;  soon, however, it was in its hundreds; and by the Truce of 11th July 1921 about 1,000 copies were being distributed world-wide (Keiko Inoue, pp6-7, citing IB 11 Nov.’21, and McKenna Napoli in FG 18,346 NLI; and Napoli, CA, p513;  also DE Publicity Report, Aug. 1921).  

Brennan and Gallagher were tireless workers and talented writers.  Their flair, moreover, was combined with a minute attention to detail.  With the help of their staff, and in co-operation with Diarmuid O’Hegarty, they carefully compiled files of indexed press clippings to provide the basic information for many an article in the Bulletin.  

In the judgement of McKenna—

“…it is absolutely true to affirm that though ‘The Irish Bulletin’ had been founded by Griffith, FitzGerald and Brennan, its mainspring was Frank Gallagher and, that without his courage and genius, it might have failed its purpose, or, at best, have taken a less effective form”  (Kathleen McKenna, ‘The Irish Bulletin’, Capuchin Annual, 1970, p. 507).  

Gallagher, in his turn, attributed the success of the journal to Brennan, writing that it was he who gave the Bulletin “its character and form”, as “day after day it set out, not in argument, but in cold, hard fact the reality of the horrors of British rule in Ireland” (David Hogan, The Four Glorious Years, Dublin, 1953, p86).  Brennan, who was always fulsome in his praise of Gallagher, recorded that he, himself, was principally responsible for the first volume of the Bulletin, and Gallagher for the other three (Brennan, Allegiance, p264 ?? date of ending vol.1).

Dublin Castle Response To The Working Of Dail Eireann 

 While Dail Eireann was advancing its plans to create a counter-state, and the Sinn Fein propaganda machine was being established on sound foundations, steps were being taken to oppose these developments more forcibly by Dublin Castle.  Central to this policy was the enhancement of Sir John Taylor’s position in relation to that of James MacMahon, the Assistant Under-Secretary.  On 10th November 1919, Saunderson, French’s Secretary, made it clear that James MacMahon was still regarded as a source of weakness:  “I think that something should be done at the Castle to remove the hiatus which occurs during the short visits to the Office of MacMahon”.  Saunderson complained that, when MacMahon was in the office, Taylor did not see the important papers and, therefore, could not function effectively at Executive Council Meetings.  Saunderson appealed to Watt to ensure that Taylor saw all the essential papers because his “very wish is to carry out his work in the best interest of the Chief Secretary and the Government” (Saunderson to Watt, 10 Nov. 1919, Strathcarron MS 490, Bodleian).  The implication was that MacMahon did not have the same wish.         

The importance of Taylor was confirmed in a letter of French to Macpherson on 19th November 1919.  French had received a draft notice from Macpherson to facilitate deportation, under the terms of DORA and had modified it after a meeting with Taylor, Saunderson and Wynn, the Chief Crown Solicitor.  Macpherson was requested to approve of the amended notice.  The proposal was to deport fifteen people in the first instance, possibly extending the number to thirty later, and “the dossier of each man” was prepared by Taylor.  

It was noted that the name of Michael Collins should be on the list but that the police found it impossible to locate him.  Macpherson immediately wired through to Taylor on 20th November, “approving the notice so that things might go ahead” (Macpherson to French, 20 Nov. 1919, Strathcarron MS 490, Bodleian).  

Macpherson added that he was busy with the meetings of the Cabinet, the Irish Committee, and the Irish Sub-Committee, so that he could not get to Ireland until near Christmas.  He was also occupied with an Education Bill that he had introduced into Parliament on 24th November 1919 (Mary Harris, The Catholic Church And The Foundation of the Northern Irish State, Cork, 1993, p25 and other references). The impression is given that Macpherson was more than content to leave Irish affairs in the hands of Lord French and Taylor. 

French and Taylor, for their part, acted firmly.  On 25th November 1919 the Sinn Fein organisation—which had already been suppressed in Dublin—was suppressed, along with several other organisations, in all parts of Ireland (Diary 25 Nov.’19??;  Carty and Dublin Gazetteer,plus press).  

On 26th November, the offices of Sinn Fein at 6 Harcourt Street were again raided.  A few hours earlier Childers and Gallagher had been in the building, preparing material on the state of Ireland for Wedgwood Benn to use in the House of Commons.  Having escaped the raid, Childers made arrangements to hire 20 Wellington Road, Dublin, as a base for his family in Ireland.  The decision to reside in Ireland having been made, Childers departed for London on 27th November 1919.   

It was against this background that Walter Long, in his capacity as Chairman of the Irish Committee, after a lengthy interview with Lord French and Macpherson, drafted a Secret Memorandum on Ireland, on 4th December 1919.  He had also discussed the matter with Bonar Law and others  (J.S. Barnes, secy. of Long, to Macpherson, 4 Dec. 1919 and four page memo., Strathcarron MS 490, Bodleian).  The Memorandum was concerned with law and order.  In particular it was an attempt to deal with the specific issues raised by Lord French since early in the month of October.   

 Among its conclusions was a recommendation that deportation should be confined to those believed to be responsible for “the criminal conspiracy to murder police officers” (Barnes to Macpherson, 4 Dec. 1919).  Another recommendation was that the Irish Government should be “at liberty to impose martial law where and when they please without reference to the Cabinet”.  In support of these decisions, Long mentioned that Lloyd George would, in a coming speech in Manchester, publicise the conditions in Ireland that made such measures necessary.  “There exists undoubtedly in Ireland”, Lloyd George was to say, “a criminal conspiracy to destroy Government by the murder of loyal and efficient policemen” (Barnes to Macpherson, 4 Dec. 1919).

In regard to General Sir J. A. Byrne, Long reported the long-held view of the Irish Ministers that he was not the man for the job, and he recounted that “they have an admirable substitute ready to their hand in Mr. Smith, late Chief Commissioner in Belfast”.  Long boldly recommended that Byrne be suspended and that Smith, who was already working at RIC headquarters, should take his place (Barnes to  Macpherson, 4 Dec. 1919).  The sidelining, and subsequent sacking, of Byrne served as a prelude to important initiatives in regard to the police forces (French to Macpherson, 10 Dec. 1919, Strathcarron MS 490, Bodleian, for termination of Byrne’s Office).

On the same day, 4th December 1919, that Long wrote his memorandum, there was a meeting of a Committee of Inquiry into the Detective Organisation of the Irish Police Forces.   The composition of the Committee reflected the changing balance of power at Dublin Castle.   Neither MacMahon, Under-Secretary, nor Byrne, Inspector General of the RIC, were present.   Representing the police forces were W. Edgeworth Johnstone, CC of the DMP, and T.J. Smith DIG of the RIC, while the representatives of the civil administration were Sir John Taylor and Alan Bell, a resident magistrate (Committee of Inquiry into the Detective Organisation of the Irish Police Forces, 7 Dec. 1919, French Papers 75/46/12, IWM).  

Bell’s entry onto the scene inevitably meant a further hardening of Government policy.  He and Taylor were long-term associates.  Although Bell was a Resident Magistrate of Lurgan, County Armagh, he had been a District Inspector of the RIC.  Born in Banagher, the son of a Protestant rector, he had joined the police force and as a detective had become a protégé of James Ellis French, the head of the British spy service in Ireland.  He was appointed a District Inspector in 1879 and played a prominent part is suppressing the nationalist protests during the Land League issues of the 1880’s.  He was particularly active and successful in tracing secret Land League financial accounts.  

Like Taylor he was fully conversant with the powers at his disposal by virtue of the Jubilee Coercion Act of 1887, and these powers were further extended by a change in the law on 15th October 1919, which conferred on him judicial powers that were explicitly denied to the English judiciary.  The publication of the Crimes attributed to Sinn Fein some days earlier may well have been used to justify the new powers conferred on Alan Bell (?? source IB and others ?? book on DORA).

The Committee of Inquiry noted that there was a failure to detect what they termed political crime, due to terrorism and the isolation of the police forces, and frankly admitted that the DMP was particularly vulnerable.  “At present”, the Report stated, “The Sinn Feiners know all the detectives in “G” Division, but the “G” Division have not the same intimate knowledge of them”.  This, the Report concluded, is “a great handicap” (Committee of Inquiry, 7 Dec. 1919, French 75/46/12, IWM).  To overcome this difficulty, it was recommended that twelve young RIC men should act as a secret corps in Dublin, and that “an accredited agent” from America should come to Ireland and infiltrate the extreme section of Sinn Fein.  

Apart from these future plans, it was proposed that an Assistant Commissioner be appointed to the DMP, and that weekly meetings should be held by representatives of Dublin Castle, the DMP and the RIC.  The purpose and intent of the Committee was to activate the police forces:  and in that renewal process Taylor and Bell had important roles.    

The creation of a Taylor-Bell axis would, in itself, have led to an increase in the confrontation between Dublin Castle and Dail Eireann.  However, it was further accentuated by the effective demotion of James MacMahon.  On 11th December 1919, French wrote to Macpherson asserting that—

“steps must be taken at once to cut MacMahon off from any access to papers or documents which really matter… the only thing to do is to separate the duties of the Under Secretary and the Asst. Under Secretary entirely” (French to Macpherson, 11 Dec. 1919, Strathcarron MS 490, Bodleian).

French urged Macpherson to act on the above request immediately so that we—“remedy the terrible state of things existing now at the Castle”, where “the place seems to be honeycombed with spies and informers and men who cannot be trusted” (ibid.)  In reply Macpherson issued a statement in which he praised Taylor’s past experience “relating to the Resident Magistracy, police, crime, prisoners and the employment of demobilised soldiers”, and concluded that, “without disparagement” to MacMahon, the work, in those areas, should be concentrated in his hands (Reply of Machpherson attached to letter of French of 11 Dec. 1919).  Having participated in making these changes, Macpherson departed for a rest to the south of France.   

[British Developments]

During Macpherson’s absence, Lord French and Sir John Taylor were confirmed as the prime movers in the British administration, while Walter Long continued to map out a new political settlement for Ireland in the form of a new measure of Home Rule.  There was a firm resolution by the Dublin Castle authorities to meet the challenge of Sinn Fein with all the force of the law.  Individuals were deported, organisations were suppressed, the press was silenced, and efforts were made to secure the financial assets of Dail Eireann.  In this last task the experience of Alan Bell in securing the secret assets of the Land League was used to great effect against the financial structures put in place by Michael Collins.   

Following the recommendations of the Police Inquiry that reported on 7th December, steps were taken to improve the efficiency of the police forces and to harmonise their work with that of the military.  As part of that process of reform, District Inspector Redmond of Belfast was appointed to act as Assistant Commissioner to Johnstone at the DMP.  The message emanating from Dublin Castle was clear:  there was to be no compromise with the Irish national movement as represented by Dail Eireann and Sinn Fein;  there was to be every effort to suppress all aspects of their work and all Departments associated with them.  The Sinn Fein Department of propaganda was one of the targets to be eliminated, but the Dail Loan and the Finance Department under Collins continued to be the prime objectives of Dublin Castle. 

On a political level the proposals of Long’s Committee spelt out equally clearly that there was be no compromise with the Proclamations calling for Independence by Dail Eireann.  The declared policy of the British Government during the Paris Conference was not to be changed.  After many meetings in the months of October, November and December, the Committee advocated the establishment of two parliaments in Ireland, one for Ulster and another for the rest of the country—both parliaments having restricted powers;  it also recommended establishment of a Council of Ireland, to include representatives of the entire island;  and the retention of sixty-four Irish seats at Westminster to preserve some form of Imperial unity (Catherine B. Shannon, Arthur J. Balfour and Ireland, 1874-1922, Washington DC, 1988, p248).  The Committee, despite ignoring completely the democratic wishes of most of the Irish people as expressed in the 1918 General Election, asserted that their proposals were in accord with the principle of self-determination.  

However, Balfour found that even this particular British notion of self-determination inside the Empire was too much of a concession to Ireland.   

 In a dissenting memorandum on 25th November 1919—which illustrates well the extreme form of Unionism that was entrenched deep inside Lloyd George’s Government—he denied that “Ireland, all Ireland has a separate national existence, and should naturally and properly be organised as a single individual political unit” (Shannon, Balfour, p248).  

He proposed that the loyalty of Ulster merited them a full place inside the United Kingdom, and maintained that the rest of Ireland should have “to endure Home Rule” (Ibid. p249).  His conclusion, redolent of racist and religious bigotry, laid bare many of the realities governing the Imperial ethic.  “No human being”, Balfour affirmed, “would ever think of forcing the loyal and Protestant North into the same political mould as the disloyal and Roman Catholic south” (ibid. p250, ?? Long, Kendle and BLaw).  

Dail Eireann and Sinn Fein were slow to respond to the new constitutional landscape that was being fashioned in London as the year 1919 ended, although Griffith did warn de Valera about the proposed two Parliaments in a letter of 8th December (Griffith to de Valera, 8 Dec. 1919, de Valera Papers/1692).  

The main target of their propaganda campaign remained the policy and conduct of the British administration in Ireland, civil, military and police, that touched their lives most immediately. (To be continued)